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THE WORST FORM OF CHAMPIONSHIP, EXCEPT FOR ALL
OF THE OTHERS THAT HAVE BEEN TRIED:
ANALYZING THE POTENTIAL ANTI-TRUST
VULNERABILITY OF THE BOWL
CHAMPIONSHIP SERIES
DAVID L. RiccI*
I. INTRODUCTION
Winston Churchill once remarked that democracy is the worst
form of government, besides for all of the others that have been
tried.' College football fans could express a similar sentiment with
regards to the Bowl Championship Series ("BCS"). While far from
a perfect system, it nevertheless has worked more effectively than
any previously employed system for the purpose of crowing a na-
tional champion for high-level college football.2
The BCS does not lack critics.3 Some are playoff proponents,
who lament that high-level college football is the only sport admin-
istered by the National Collegiate Athletic Association ("NCAA")
without a playoff system.4 Others are supporters of non-BCS con-
ference universities who desire a chance to compete for a national
* J.D., Villanova University School of Law, 2012; B.S., The Pennsylvania State
University, Smeal College of Business, 2008. This comment is dedicated to my late
father, Lawrence Patrick Ricci.
1. See Sir Winston Churchill, QUOTATIONS PAGE, http://www.quotationspage.
com/quote/24926.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2011) ("Many forms of Government
have been tried, and will be tried in this world of sin and woe. No one pretends
that democracy is perfect or all-wise. Indeed, it has been said that democracy is the
worst form of government except all those other forms that have been tried from
time to time.").
2. For a discussion of the difficulties in naming a national champion in col-
lege football prior to the BCS, see infra notes 28-39 and accompanying text.
3. See, e.g., Lawmakers Rally Against the BCS, ESPN, http://sports.espn.go.com/
ncf/news/story?id=3854081 (last updated Jan. 23, 2009) (reviewing criticism of
BCS following 2008 college football season); Subcommittee Oks College Playoff Bill,
ESPN (Dec. 10, 2009), http://sports.espn.go.com/ncf/news/story?id=4727426
(outlining a proposed political response to the BCS). For a further discussion of
congressional criticism of the BCS, see infra note 5 and accompanying text.
4. See History, NCAA.ORG, http://www.ncaa.org/wps/wcm/connect/public/
NCAA/Aboutmhe+NCAA/Who+We+Are/Aboutwhe+NCAAlstory (last updated
Nov. 10, 2010) (reviewing history of NCAA). The NCAA is the governing body for
college athletics in the United States. See id. (identifying purpose of NCAA). The
NCAA organizes championships for lower levels of college football, but not for
high-level college football. See Katherine McClelland, Should College Football's Cur-
rency Read "In BCS We Trust" or Is It just Monopoly Money: Anti-Trust Implications of the
Bowl Championship Series, 37 TEx. TECH L. REV. 167, 175 (2004) (noting that the
(541)
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title and a greater share of the financial pie associated with college
bowl games.5 While the debate surrounding the BCS has largely
been waged in the arena of public relations, several antitrust law-
suits have been threatened.6 Most recently, the Justice Department
has indicated it is in the preliminary stages of preparing an antitrust
case against the BCS.7 The commentary on the potential success of
such challenges has been mixed.8
NCAA defers to independent polls instead of sponsoring national championship
game for highest level of college football).
5. See, e.g., McClelland, supra note 4, at 210-11 (noting congressional hearings
about BCS); Leslie Bauknight Nixon, Playoff or Bust: The Bowl Championship Debate
Hits Congress (Again), 21 ST. THOMAS L. REv. 365, 365-66 (2009) (noting support of
executive and legislative branches of government for reform of college football
championships); H.R. 1120, 111th Cong. (2009) (exemplifying congressional bill
to eliminate BCS); Championship Fairness Act of 2009, H.R. 599, 111th Congress
(2009) (exemplifying congressional bill to establish college football playoff).
6. See, e.g., Utah AG: BCS May Violate Anti-Trust Laws, ESPN, http://
sports.espn.go.com/ncf/news/story?id=3814 4 72 (last updated Jan. 7, 2009) (com-
menting on Utah attorney general's anti-trust investigation of BCS); Steve Wieburg
& Kelly Whiteside, Utah AG Says He Will File Antitrust Lawsuit Against BCS, USA
TODAY, http://www.usatoday.com/sports/college/football/2011-04-20-bcs-anti-
trust-lawsuit_- N.htm (last updated Apr. 20, 2011, 8:05 PM) (noting pending
lawsuit).
7. See Andy Schwartz, BCS: Antitrust Storm Clouds Gather, ESPN (May 11, 2011),
http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/commentary/news/story?page=schwarz/ 110510
(noting ongoing DOJ investigation of BCS). Ultimately these threats of lawsuits
may be more smoke than fire, but their prevalence over the years suggests that
sooner or later the BCS will come under antitrust scrutiny. See id. (reviewing po-
tential legal issues of BCS).
8. See, e.g., McClelland, supra note 4, at 213 (finding that unequal playing field
between BCS and non-BCS universities constitutes anti-trust violation); Nathaniel
Grow, Antitrust & The Bowl Championship Series, 2 HARV. J. SPORTs & ENT. L. 53, 98
(2011) (claiming BCS is susceptible to group boycott or price fixing claims in part
because pro competitive benefits of BCS can be achieved through less restrictive
means); Jodi M. Warmbrod, Antitrust in Amateur Athletics: Forth and Long: Why Non-
BCS Universities Should Punt Rather Than Go For An Antitrust Challenge to the Bowl
Championship Series, 57 OKLA. L. REv. 333, 379 (2004) (finding that Sherman Act
will not provide legal remedy to non-BCS universities and suggesting alternative
methods to pursue reform); Jude D. Schmit, A Fresh Set ofDowns?: Why Recent Modi-
fications to the Bowl Championship Series Still Draw a Flag Under the Sherman Act, 14
SPORTS LAw. J. 219, 254 (2007) (determining that inherent inequalities of BCS
which deprive non-BCS teams an equal chance to compete constitute antitrust vio-
lation); Jasen R. Corns, Pigskin Paydirt: The Thriving of College Football's Bowl Champi-
onship Series in the Face of Antitrust Law, 39 TULSA L. REv. 167, 205 (2003) (claiming
BCS is inherently anticompetitive agreement of perpetual nature); Mark Hales,
The Antitrust Issues of NCAA College Football Within the Bowl Championship Series, 10
SPORTs LAw.J. 97, 132 (2003) (finding BCS violates antitrust laws under both per se
approach and rule of reason analysis); David Scott Moreland, The Antitrust Implica-
tions of the Bowl Championship Series: Analysis Through Analogous Reasoning, 21 GA. ST.
U. L. REv. 721, 748-49 (2005) (finding BCS narrowly tailored to goal of matching
up best teams and therefore in violation of antitrust law); C. Paul Rodgers III, The
Quest for Number One in College Football: The Revised Bowl Championship Series, Anti-
trust, and the Winner Take All Syndrome, 18 MARQ. SPORTs L. Rav. 285, 299 (2008)
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Framed in the era of John D. Rockefeller, Andrew Carnegie,
and JP Morgan, the Sherman Anti-Trust Act is aimed at businesses
acting in an anti-competitive manner, with the idea that society will
benefit from fully competitive markets.9 While directed primarily
at business, it has also been used creatively in the athletic context.
For example, the National Football League Players Association
decertified as a union and pursued anti-trust litigation against the
National Football League to secure true free agency for its mem-
bers.10 In the college context, member institutions have success-
fully challenged the NCAA using antitrust law to eliminate
television broadcast restrictions." The BCS may be the next target
of such an unusual Sherman Act suit.12 The success of such a suit
will depend on the goal of the party bringing it.13
At first glance, the antitrust laws may seem ill suited to change
a system to facilitate athletic competition for the national title in
FBS college football. But, bowl games and their associated televi-
sion rights are big businesses.14 For all the talk about ensuring fair-
[hereinafter Rodgers] (indicating BCS may be liable under section 2 of Sherman
Act due to prior conduct).
9. See McClelland, supra note 4, at 191-92 (purpose of Sherman Act is to "pro-
vide a 'federal enactment of the common law' of restraints of trade and monopo-
lies, with courts having wide discretion in framing its rules and guidelines"); Apex
Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 492-93 (1940) (Sherman Act "was enacted in
the era of 'trusts' and of 'combinations' of businesses and of capital organized and
directed to control of the market by suppression of competition in the marketing
of goods and services, the monopolistic tendency of which had become a matter of
public concern. The end sought was the prevention of restraints to free competi-
tion in business and commercial transactions which tended to restrict production,
raise prices or otherwise control the market to the detriment of purchasers or
consumers of goods and services, all of which had come to be regarded as a special
form of public injury.").
10. See, e.g., Brown v. Pro Football Inc., 518 U.S. 231 (1996) (exemplifying
NFL anti-trust lawsuit litigated up to United States Supreme Court); White v. Nat'l
Football League, 836 F. Supp. 1458 (D. Minn 1993) (holding that NFL had com-
mitted an anti-trust violation); McNeil v. Nat'l Football League, 790 F. Supp. 871
(D. Minn. 1992) (invalidating "Plan B" free agency as an anti-trust violation).
These cases were followed by settlement negotiations resulting in the National
Football League Collective Bargaining Agreement of 1993, which after several re-
newals terminated in early 2011. See Mike Florio, Batterman Addresses Current Issues
in CBA Fight, PRO FOOTBALL TALK (Feb. 17, 2011, 10:08 AM), http://profoot-
balltalk.nbcsports.com/2011/02/1 7/batterman-addresses-current-issues-in-cba-
fight/ (reviewing path from NFL CBA of 1993 to present CBC negotiations).
11. See Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984)
(invalidating restrictions on broadcast of college football games).
12. See supra note 6 (emphasizing typical threatened antitrust lawsuit against
the BCS).
13. For a discussion of what constitutes a "win" for a BCS challenger, see infra
notes 312-339 and accompanying text.
14. See Chas Rich, Money Says the BCS Will Not Be Going Away, AOL NEWS
(Nov. 5, 2008, 11:25 PM), http://www.aolnews.com/2008/11/05/money-says-the-
2012] 543
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ness and access to opportunities to compete for a championship,
the reality is that the controversy over the college bowl system is
really about the money.15 Because of the scale of the business as-
pects of the bowl system, the use of the anti-trust law is quite under-
standable. Accordingly, this comment will focus on analyzing the
BCS from a business perspective.' 6
This comment will first review the historical background of the
college bowl system, college football championships, and the devel-
opment and refinement of the BCS.17 It will then outline the BCS
and its operation as currently constituted.18 After establishing a fac-
tual background, the comment provides an overview of the relevant
anti-trust law.' 9 Finally, the comment will evaluate the BCS under
various theories under the Sherman Act.20
II. HISTORY AND BACKGROUND
The college bowl system and the system for crowning a football
national champion developed in parallel, and became more incom-
patible as time passed. As dissatisfaction increased, high-level bowl
games and major conferences began working together to improve
the system, culminating in the creation of the BCS in 1998.21 Since
bcs-will-not-be-going-away/ (noting that negotiations for BCS television rights be-
gan with discussions of annual rights fees averaging $132 million).
15. For a discussion of the revenue imbalances inherent in the BCS system,
see infra note 193.
16. See Warmbrod, supra note 8, at 363-69 (reviewing reasoning of Supreme
Court in applying rule of reason in case involving collegiate athletics). This is the
correct approach for an anti-trust inquiry into the BCS. See id. at 369-70 (identify-
ing rule of reason as most appropriate analytical framework for antitrust analysis of
BCS). Courts have distinguished on several occasions that there is a difference
between athletic and economic competition. See, e.g., Tuscano v. PGA Tour Inc.,
201 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1121 (E.D. Cal 2002) ("In producing an entertainment
product, the [PGA] Tour incorporates an element of competition as part of the
product but the [participants] are not in economic competition with one another
any more than the celebrity participants in a game show or the runners in a track
meet. The presence of obvious procompetitive justifications for the ... rules, in
the sense that they help to create the product, and the corresponding absence of
clear anticompetitive effect, require application of full rule of reason analysis.").
17. For a discussion of the history and evolution of college football and the
BCS, see infra notes 21-49 and accompanying text.
18. For a discussion of BCS outline and operation, see infra notes 50-96 and
accompanying text.
19. For an outline of the relevant anti-trust law, see infra notes 111-159 and
accompanying text.
20. For an analysis of the BCS under Sherman Act theories, see infra notes
160-339 and accompanying text.
21. For a discussion of the creation of the BCS, see infra notes 33-39 and ac-
companying text.
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then, the BCS has undergone numerous revisions, and has often
been at the center of controversy.22
A. Development of the Bowl System
At first, there was no postseason college football. The history
of what would become the BCS began in 1902, with the first East-
West game, the predecessor to the Rose Bowl.2 3 Since then, the
number of bowl games has exploded, and as of 2010 there are
thirty-five college bowl games.2 4 Bowls are now so numerous that if
more bowls are added, there may not be enough bowl-eligible col-
lege football teams to play in them.25
In its initial state, contractual ties and relationships between
the NCAA conferences and the bowl sponsors dominated the bowl
system.26 The Rose Bowl is a well known example of this trend,
having held long-running contracts ensuring that the Big Ten and
Pac Ten champion would play each other every year on New Year's
Day. 27 These contracts benefitted the bowls by ensuring a supply of
22. For a discussion of various BCS controversies, see infra notes 97-110 and
accompanying text.
23. See Rose Bowl Game, ROSE BowL HISTORY, http://web.archive.org/web/
20090301053552/http://www.rosebowlhistory.org/rosebowl-game.php (last visited
Apr. 10, 2012) (reviewing history of Rose Bowl game); see also McClelland, supra
note 4, at 176 (describing creation of Rose Bowl).
24. See College Bowls 2010-2011, ESPN, http://espn.go.com/college-football/
bowls (last visited Apr. 10, 2012) (listing 2010-2011 bowl games, participants, and
outcomes). The NCAA sets standards for bowl games and bowl participants. See
Corns, supra note 8, at 178 (reviewing requirements for bowl games). Participants
must have at least six victories against FBS opponents and at least as many wins as
losses. See id. (identifying minimum requirements of BCS participant). The bowls
themselves must also meet minimum standards set forth by the NCAA. See id.
(describing requirements of bowl hosts).
25. See Brett McMurphy, Bowl Predictions: Still Waiting on Enough Teams to
Earn Eligibility, AOL NEWS (Nov. 19, 2010, 8:44 AM), http://www.aolnews.com/
2010/11/19/bowl-projections-still-waiting-on-enough-teams-to-earn-eligibil/ (not-
ing that as of November 19, 2010 only fifty-four of 120 FBS teams were bowl eligi-
ble). With thirty-five bowl games, there is a requirement for seventy bowl eligible
teams. See id. (indicating that additional twenty six bowl eligible teams were
needed).
26. See Rose Bowl, supra note 23 (acknowledging history of the Rose Bowl); see
also McClelland, supra note 4, at 176 (noting long running historical ties of Rose
Bowl, Pac Ten, and Big Ten). The Rose Bowl is the best example of a bowl game
with strong historical conference tie-ins that survived through several predecessors
of the BCS. See id. (reviewing history of Rose Bowl). However, many bowls have
contractual ties to specific conferences. See 2010-2011 College Football Season Bowl
Results, COLLEGE FOOTBALL POLL, http://www.collegefootballpoll.com/2010
archivebowls.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2012) (listing conference ties, dates,
scores, and payouts of bowl games following 2010 season).
27. See McClelland, supra note 4, at 176 (noting long running historical ties of
Rose Bowl, Pac Ten, and Big Ten).
2012] 545
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high quality teams, while providing the conferences with guaran-
teed access to a prestigious bowl game.
The national championship system for high level college foot-
ball had a similar ad hoc development. At first, the Associated Press
("AP") poll and the Coaches' Poll selected the college football
champions.28 Initially, these two polls selected a champion at the
end of the regular season, before the bowl games were even
played.29 This could lead to unusual occurrences, such as Richard
Nixon declaring that the University of Texas ("Texas") had won the
1969 national championship before the team had even won its bowl
game.30 The Pennsylvania State University's ("Penn State") head
coach Joe Paterno famously remarked "I wonder how Nixon knew
so little about Watergate in 1973 but so much about college football
in 1969."31
Such controversy was commonplace until the 1990s. From
1968 to 1992 the number one team played the number two team
only eight times.32 In an effort to improve the process for deter-
28. See Associated Press Poll, DATABASE FOOTBALL, http://www.databasefootball.
com/College/polls/polllist.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 2012) (archiving AP poll data
from 1936 to 2008). The AP poll was the first poll used to select a college football
champion, dating to 1936. See id. (listing AP national champions). The poll
ceased to be part of the BCS formula in 2004. See BCS Replaces AP Poll With New
Harris Ranking, NBC SPORTS, http://nbcsports.msnbc.com/id/8543965/ (last up-
dated July 12, 2005, 8:13 AM) (noting Harris poll replaced AP poll as BCS compo-
nent). The Coaches' Poll is newer, and remains a part of the BCS formula. See
USA Today Football Bowl Subdivision Coaches Poll, AFCA.com, http://www.afca.com/
article/article.php?id=USAPOLLINTRO (last visited Apr. 10, 2012) (outlining or-
igins and history of USA Today Coaches' Poll).
29. See College Football National Champions, COLLEGE FOOTBALL POLL, http://
www.collegefootballpoll.com/championsnational.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2012)
(noting that during some periods of history champions were selected before bowls
were played).
30. See, e.g., National Championship Moments: 1969 Football, TEXAS SPORTS,
http://www.texassports.com/genrel/103006aaa.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2012)
(noting President Nixon awarded national championship prior to bowl victory).
In the late 1960s, unlike today, the national championship was awarded before the
bowl games were played. See id. (exemplifying previous practice).
31. See Shelly Anderson, Research Shows Nixon Hurt 69 Lions, PrrTSBURGH PosT-
GAZETTE (Nov. 17, 2006), http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/06321/739083-198.
stm (revisiting circumstances of 1969 football season); see also Nicholas Evan
Sarantakas, Nixon Versus Paterno: College Football and Presidential Politics, 73 PENN-
sYLvANIA HisToRY 236-60 (2006) (providing thorough account of Nixon-Paterno
feud) available at https://www.usnwc.edu/Academics/Faculty/Nicholas-Sarantakes/Publi-
cations/Articles/PAH-Article.aspx (last visited Apr. 11, 2012).Joe Paterno's Penn State
team was also undefeated in 1969 but was denied an opportunity to play Texas for
a national title. See id. (describing circumstances behind 1969 national title
decision).
32. See BCS Chronology, BCS FOOTBALL, http://www.bcsfootball.org/news/
story?id=4819366 (last updated Jan. 21, 2010, 3:28 PM) (noting there were only
eight matchups between top two teams in fifty-six years prior to creation of Bowl
[Vol. 19: p. 541
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mining a champion, a group of the leading conferences and bowls
came together to create the Bowl Coalition, an agreement where
member conferences would relinquish their contractual ties to
bowls where necessary to create a matchup between the two top
ranked teams.33
The Bowl Coalition still did not include the Rose Bowl, Big
Ten, or Pac 10, leaving open the possibility of a split national cham-
pionship in some circumstances. 34 The University of Washington
("Washington") and the University of Miami ("Miami"), ranked
number one and two in 1992, could not play for the title because
Washington was obligated to play in the Rose Bowl as the Pac 10
Champion, and accordingly split the national title.35 The same situ-
Coalition). It should be noted that prior to the creation of the BCS there was no
single set of college rankings that was "official" and that the rankings of the differ-
ent polls were not always in agreement, resulting in numerous split national cham-
pionships, most recently in 2004. See College Football National Champions, http://
www.collegefootballpoll.com/championsnational.html (last updatedJan. 8, 2011)
(noting split national titles in 1992 and 1997); see also Schmit, supra note 8, at 228-
29 (describing Bowl Coalition and Bowl Alliance era of college football). Cf College
Football National Champions, HICKOK SPORTS, http://www.hickoksports.com/his-
tory/cfchamps.shtml (last visited Apr. 11, 2012) (exemplifying how many different
organizations have ranked college football teams and declared national
champions).
33. See Schmit, supra note 8, at 228-29 (describing creation of the Bowl Coali-
tion). When the Bowl Coalition was created, the organization of college football
conferences was somewhat different than it was today. At the time, the Big Twelve
was the Big Eight, and the Southwestern Conference was still in existence and was
a major power with contractual ties to the Cotton Bowl. See id. (reviewing evolu-
tion of conferences).
34. See id. (describing Bowl Coalition operation and noting absence of Big
Ten, Pac Ten, and Rose Bowl from initial Bowl Coalition). In the Bowl Coalition,
the champions of the Big East Conference and Atlantic Coast Conference and
Notre Dame met either the champion of the Big Eight (in the Orange Bowl),
Southeastern (Sugar Bowl) or Southwest (Cotton Bowl) conferences. See id. (re-
viewing Bowl Coalition matchmaking process). If the champions of the Big East or
ACC or Notre Dame had been ranked No. I or 2 at the end of the regular season,
they would have met in the Fiesta Bowl for the national championship. See id.
(describing creation of potential title games). Their vacated spots in either the
Orange, Sugar or Cotton Bowls would have been filled from a pool of at-large
teams made up of the number two teams from the Atlantic Coast, Big East, Big
Eight, Pac Ten and Southwest conferences. See id. (reviewing replacement team
selection procedures). To guarantee those at-large teams a post-season home, the
conferences contracted with the Gator Bowl and John Hancock Bowl to ensure
slots for these number two teams. See id. (noting creation of additional matchups
for second place teams).
35. See College Football National Champions, COLLEGE FOOTBALL POLL, http://
www.collegefootballpoll.com/championsnational.html (last updatedJan. 8, 2011)
(noting split national titles in 1991 and 1997). On two occasions under the Bowl
Coalition and Bowl Alliance the unavailability of a Big Ten or Pac Ten team for a
title game resulted in a split national championship. See id. (identifying split na-
tional titles). In 1992, the University of Miami ("Miami") and the University of
Washington ("Washington") were denied a chance to play each other because of
5472012]
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ation repeated in 1994, where an undefeated Penn State team was
denied a matchup with an undefeated University of Nebraska ("Ne-
braska") team, which was ultimately awarded the title.36
The Bowl Coalition was refined following these controversies,
becoming the Bowl Alliance.37 The Bowl Alliance introduced the
concept of the rotational national championship game, in which
the right to host the title game would rotate among the member
bowls.38 As negotiations continued, the Big Ten, Pac Ten, and
Rose Bowl eventually joined and the Bowl Championship Series was
born, beginning with the 1998 season.39
For several years, the BCS functioned effectively under its origi-
nal formulation. However, the 2003 season brought controversy
when the top two teams in the human polls, the University of
Southern California ("USC") and the University of Oklahoma
Washington's obligation to the Rose Bowl, resulting in a split national champion-
ship. See id. (noting split national title in 1992). Penn State, after going un-
defeated in 1994, was also obligated to appear in the Rose Bowl. See supra note 34
(noting Big Ten was not part of Bowl Coalition due to Rose Bowl ties). Despite
soundly defeating Oregon in the Rose Bowl, the championship was awarded to an
undefeated Nebraska team which Penn State was unable to play due to the struc-
ture of the Bowl Coalition. See College Football National Champions, COLLEGE FOOT-
BALL PoLL, http://www.collegefootballpoll.com/championsnational.html (last
updated Jan. 8, 2011) (proclaiming Nebraska as 1994 champion). This same issue
appeared again in 1997, when a split national championship resulted from the
University of Michigan ("Michigan") being obligated to appear in the Rose Bowl,
preventing a matchup with Nebraska in a Bowl Alliance game. See id. (noting exis-
tence of split national championship in 1997); see also Schmit, supra note 8, at 228-
29 (describing the Bowl Coalition and Bowl Alliance era of college football).
36. See 1994 Penn State Nittany Lions, TOTAL FOOTBALL STATs, http://www.
totalfootballstats.com/TeamCollege.asp?id=123&Season=1994 (last visited Apr.
11, 2012) (noting undefeated record of Penn State including Rose Bowl victory).
Because of the structure of the Bowl Coalition, an undefeated Big Ten team was
denied a chance to play for the national title. See supra note 34 (noting Big Ten
was not part of Bowl Coalition due to Rose Bowl ties). This was likely a factor
which encouraged the Big Ten and Rose Bowl to join the BCS four years later, as
discussed infra note 39.
37. For a discussion of the evolution of the Bowl Coalition into the Bowl Alli-
ance and the BCS, see supra note 32; see also Schmit, supra note 8, at 229 (describ-
ing creation of Bowl Alliance). It should not be overlooked that this was a time of
great competitive pressure on the bowl games themselves. See Corns, supra note 8,
at 172 (noting difficult competitive environment for bowl games in early 1990s).
38. See Corns, supra note 8, at 172-73 (describing development of BCS). Even
though the National Championship game is separate from the other BCS games
today, the rotating site remains a feature of the modern BCS. See id. (acknowledg-
ing continual rotation of BCS title game sit). At this time the Fiesta Bowl replaced
the Cotton Bowl, and in 1996 the Big Eight Conference became the Big Twelve
with the addition of elements of the Southwest Conference, which would be dis-
solved. See id. (noting change of membership during the period of the Bowl
Alliance).
39. See id. at 173-74 (detailing events leading up to formation of Bowl Champi-
onship Series).
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("Oklahoma"), were denied a title game matchup because the com-
puter rankings favored Louisiana State University ("LSU") .4 For
the first and only time in the BCS era, a split national champion-
ship resulted, as the AP elected to name USC the national title win-
ner, and not LSU, which defeated Oklahoma in the Sugar Bowl
championship game.41
Following this undesirable outcome, the rules were changed
for the 2004 season.4 2 These changes de-emphasized the computer
rankings and were designed to ensure that the top two teams in the
human polls would play each other.4 3 The 2004 BCS formula is
essentially the same system used for ranking teams that is used to-
day.4 4 This additional BCS bowl provided a dedicated national
championship that was separate from the other BCS bowls. 4 5 The
site at which it is played rotates, which is a carryover from the prior
arrangement where each BCS bowl took a turn hosting the title
40. See id. (noting which polls were BCS components). The term "human
polls" as used in this comment refers to the AP poll, the Coaches Poll, and the
Harris Poll. The Harris Poll later superseded the AP poll in the BCS formula. See
id. (identifying Harris Poll as BCS component).
41. For a list of national champions, see supra note 35. For a discussion of the
changes made to the BCS in response to the controversy of the 2003 season, see
infra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
42. See BCS Chronology, BCS FOOTBALL, http://www.bcsfootball.org/news/
story?id=4819366 (last updated Jan. 21, 2010, 3:28 PM) (noting there were only
eight matchups between the top two teams in the fifty-six years prior to the crea-
tion of the Bowl Coalition).
43. See id. (reviewing evolution of BCS formula). Many modifications were
made to the BCS ranking procedures following the 2003 season. The strength-of-
schedule, team-record, and quality-win components were removed from considera-
tion. See id. (describing changes to BCS selection formula). The standings
formula was adjusted to include the average of the computer rankings, the AP
Media Poll (later replaced by the Harris Poll), and the USA Today Coaches Poll,
each weighted one-third. See id. (exemplifying increased importance of human
polls in revised BCS formula). The computer rankings component would be the
average of six computer rankings. Id. A team's highest and lowest computer rank-
ings would be discarded when figuring a team's computer poll average. See id.
(describing computer ranking process). Points would be assigned in inverse order
of ranking from one through twenty-five; the four remaining computer scores
would be averaged and the total would be calculated as a percentage of one hun-
dred. See id. (identifying how rankings are quantified in BCS). The standings
formula would no longer average the weekly rank of each team in the media and
coaches' polls. See id. (reviewing changes to BCS formula over time). Instead, a
team would be evaluated based on the voting points it received in each poll-a
team's AP score would be its points in the poll divided by a possible 1,800 (1,500 in
the coaches' poll) voting points. See id. (describing process for calculating poll
component values).
44. For a discussion of the current structure of the BCS, see infra notes 50-80
and accompanying text.
45. For a discussion of the creation of the separate bowl game for the BCS
national title, see supra note 23-41 and accompanying text.
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game.4 6 The new arrangement has two principal advantages. First,
it creates an additional game as well as two additional BCS slots for
teams to play, while minimizing disruption to "traditional" bowl
matchups. 47 The championship game generates more income and
involves more teams.4 8 Second, it allows the national title game to
be played after all other bowls are finished, allowing for greater
buildup and excitement for the game. 4 9
B. Operation of the BCS
While many of the input elements that go into selecting which
teams play for the national title are inherently unpredictable due to
their intangible nature, the mechanics of the BCS are mostly
straightforward and transparent.50 Although critics may argue that
the human polls are inherently flawed and biased, once the inputs
are determined, the BCS operates with mathematical precision un-
til the point where at-large berths are selected, which is where the
human element re-asserts itself.5 1
1. Selecting the Participants
The participants in the BCS games are determined primarily
by the rankings under the BCS formula.5 2 The BCS formula is used
46. See BCS Chronology, supra note 42 (noting site of title game continues to
rotate).
47. See id. (acknowledging additional BCS game creates additional slots in
BCS games for more teams).
48. See id. (referencing additional at-large bids created).
49. See id. (explaining benefits of separate championship game). The BCS
title game is played a week after the other BCS games. See id. (discussing timing of
championship game).
50. For a discussion of how the BCS discloses the process for selecting which
teams play in BCS games, see infra notes 52-96 and accompanying text.
51. See, e.g., Top 25 Final Coaches' Ballots, USA TODAY (Dec. 8, 2008, 10:40 AM),
http://www.usatoday.com/sports/college/football/2008-12-08-final-coaches-bal-
lotsN.htm (recording votes in Coaches' Poll for top twenty-five teams at conclu-
sion of regular season for purposes of BCS). The disclosure of the voting biases
evidenced in the Coaches' Poll is a reminder that human beings are inherently
imperfect. See id. (displaying coaches' votes). Coaches' voting patterns may be
reflecting of personal or conference biases. See id. (containing numerous ques-
tionable rankings suggestive of bias). In part due to the controversy these disclo-
sures can create, the Coaches' Poll is electing to return to the secret ballot. See
Kelly Whiteside, Football Coaches to Keep Poll Ballots Secret, Starting in 2010, USA To-
DAY (May 28, 2009, 3:45 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/sports/college/football/
2009-05-27-coaches-poll-votesN.htm (noting end of ballot disclosures for Coaches'
Poll). With regards to at-large selections, business considerations can influence
the decisions of the bowl committees. See infra notes 73 and 243-245 and accompa-
nying text.
52. For a discussion of the at-large selection process, see infra notes 73-75 and
accompanying text.
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to rank the teams and determine which teams are eligible to play in
BCS games.5 3 Then, once the automatic berths are distributed, any
teams ranked fourteen or higher with at least nine wins are eligible
for selection as an at-large participant.54
a. The BCS Rankings
As currently constructed, the BCS ranking of a team is com-
posed of three equally weighted components. The first two are
human polls: the Harris Interactive Poll (the "Harris Poll") and the
USA Today Coaches Poll (the "Coaches' Poll").66 Each of these
polls is equally weighted.56
The third element is the "computer ranking." This is a compi-
lation of six different computer rankings that are designed to mea-
sure empirically the performance of college football teams.5 7 The
highest and lowest scores for each team are eliminated, and the
remaining scores are averaged to comprise the third ranking for all
53. For an overview of the BCS formula, see infra notes 55-60 and accompany-
ing text.
54. For a review of at-large criteria, see infra note 74 and accompanying text.
There are two types of teams in the BCS. See BCS Selection Procedures, BCS FoOTBALL
(July 21, 2011, 1:30 PM), http://www.bcsfootball.org/news/story?id=4819597
(describing duel tier structure of FBS college football). The first type includes
automatic qualifier ("AQ") teams from the Big Ten, Pac Ten, Southeastern Con-
ference ("SEC"), Big Twelve, Big East, and Atlantic Coast Conference ("ACC"). See
id. (listing applicable conferences). The champions of these conferences automat-
ically receive BCS berths. See id. (explaining hierarchy in selection for bowl
games). The remaining conferences include Conference USA, the Mid-American
Conference ("MAC"), the Mountain West Conference ("Mountain West"), the Sun
Belt Conference, and Western Athletic Conference ("WAC"), which lack guaran-
teed berths in BCS games and are referred to as non-automatic qualifying teams or
non-AQ teams. See id. (comparing AQ teams to non-AQ teams).
55. See id. (reviewing BCS selection criteria and process which strongly re-
spects the outcome of human polls). At present, the two "human polls" are the
dominant influences on the BCS rankings. See id. (referencing process to deter-
mine BCS standings). The Harris Poll replaced the AP poll starting in the 2005
football season as a BCS component. See id. (explaining history of Harris Poll use
for BCS). The process goes as follows:
Harris Interactive randomly selected ten panelists from among the names
submitted by each Conference. Notre Dame submitted a list of six quali-
fied individuals, from which Harris randomly selected three. Army and
Navy together submitted a list of three qualified individuals from which
Harris selected one. When a person leaves the panel, the conference that
originally nominated the individual nominates three others to take the
spot. Harris Interactive then randomly selects the replacement.
Id. (detailing use of Harris Poll).
56. See id. ("The Harris Interactive College Football Poll, USA Today Coaches
Poll and computer rankings each comprise one-third of the BCS Standings.").
Each human poll is worth one-third of the final BCS ranking. See id. (discussing
ranking calculations).
57. See id. (analyzing purposes of computer rankings).
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teams.5 8 The three components are then averaged to create the
BCS rankings. 59 The BCS rankings are what drive the BCS system.
Although the process is obviously subject to imperfect factors such
as voter bias and uneven scheduling, it is open and understandable,
if not always defensible.60
b. The Bowl Games
The top two teams automatically receive berths in the national
championship game.6' This provision overrides any other confer-
ence tie-ins. 62 For example, the Rose Bowl automatically receives
the Big Ten and Pac Ten champions.65 However, if one of these
conference champions is selected to play in the title game and one
non-AQ team receives an automatic BCS bid, the Rose Bowl is re-
quired to accept this team provided that this situation has not oc-
curred in the past four years.64
The Orange Bowl automatically receives the Atlantic Coast
Conference ("ACC") champion. 65 The Sugar Bowl automatically
receives the Southeastern Conference ("SEC") champion. 6 6 The Fi-
esta Bowl automatically receives the Big Twelve champion.6 7 The
58. See id. (describing procedures for calculating computer ranking element
of BCS). This is to ensure that any particular computer ranking formulation which
unfairly advantages or disadvantages a team compared to other teams does not
unduly affect the BCS rankings. See id. (proposing explanation for computer
system).
59. See id. (examining calculation scheme). The BCS Average is calculated by
averaging the percentage totals of the Harris Interactive Poll, USA Today Poll, and
computer rankings. See id. (providing ranking methodology). The teams' BCS
Averages are ranked to produce the BCS Standings. See id. (expressing outcome of
process).
60. For a discussion of the human elements of the BCS rankings and their
contribution to controversy, see supra note 51 and accompanying text.
61. See BCS Selection Procedures, BCS FOOTBALL (July 21, 2011, 1:30 PM), http:/
/www.bcsfootball.org/news/story?id=4819597 (reviewing BCS selection criteria
and process). This is an essential element of the BCS, in that bowl games must
relinquish their conference tie-ins to make the matchup between the top two
teams possible; because before the BCS, this was a significant area of difficulty. See
Schmit, supra note 8, at 228-29 (describing difficulties of pre-BCS era and their
origins); supra notes 26-39 and accompanying text.
62. See BCS Selection Procedures, BCS FOOTBALL (July 21, 2011, 1:30 PM), http:/
/www.bcsfootball.org/news/story?id=4819597 (reviewing BCS selection criteria
and process).
63. See id. (presenting Rose Bowl participants).
64. See id. (discussing alternate selection procedures). The provision requir-
ing the selection of a non-AQ team was invoked in 2010 to force the Rose Bowl to
select TCU.
65. See id. (recounting Orange Bowl participating teams).
66. See id. (outlining terms of agreement for Fiesta Bowl participants).
67. See id. (specifying Big East bowl bid for conference champion).
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Big East champion receives an automatic berth but is not assigned
to any specific bowl game.6
The highest ranked non-BCS conference champion is granted
an automatic berth provided they are ranked in the top twelve in
the BCS standings, or if they are ranked in the top sixteen and
higher than at least one BCS champion.69 Only one non-BCS team
may receive an automatic berth, but a second non-BCS team may be
selected if it meets the at-large qualifications. 70 The University of
Notre Dame ("Notre Dame") receives an automatic berth if they
are in the top eight of the BCS standings.71
The number three team is a mandatory at large selection if it is
a member of an AQ conference, provided that selecting them
would not run afoul of the limits of two teams per conference play-
ing in BCS bowl games.7 2 If the number three team receives an
automatic berth, the number four team may also receive an auto-
matic at-large selection provided it can meet the same standard.
Any remaining BCS bowl slots are filled from the available pool of
at large teams.73 Any team with at least nine wins that is ranked in
the top fourteen is eligible for at large selection. 74 Again, no con-
ference may have more than two teams playing in the BCS.7 5
68. See id. (clarifying status of non-power conference schools in BCS bowl
selection).
69. See id. (outlining non-AQ conference at large automatic qualification pro-
cess). This provision is the primary path for non-AQ teams into the BCS. See id.
(identifying requirements for non-AQ team to receive automatic berth).
70. See id. (clarifying status of non-power conference schools in BCS bowl
selection).
71. See id. (highlighting Notre Dame's separate treatment for its status as a
non-conference program).
72. See id. (qualifying entry to BCS bowl for overall number three ranking in
BCS standings).
73. See id. (identifying requirements for at-large teams). It should be noted
that the at-large selection considers far more than just the competitive merit of the
teams. Marketability also can be a driving factor, such as when the University of
Notre Dame received an at large berth in a 2006 BCS bowl over the University of
Oregon, which was ranked higher. See 2005-2006 College Footbal Season Final BCS
Standings, COLLEGE FOOTBALL POLL, http://www.collegefootballpoll.com/2005-
archive bcs.html (last visited Apr. 11, 2012) (ranking Oregon higher than Notre
Dame); BCS, Alliance, and Coalition Games Yearby Year, BCS FOOTBALL, http://www.
bcsfootball.org/news/story?id=4809942 (last visited Apr. 11, 2012) (noting Notre
Dame and not Oregon played in BCS after 2005 season). Sometimes teams simply
do not have enough supporters to make even smaller bowl games successful. See
Hales, supra note 8, at 120 (noting that BYU was only able to sell 5,500 tickets to
2001 Liberty Bowl, far short of 8,751 required to break even).
74. See BCS Selection Procedures, BCS FOOTBALL, http://www.bcsfootball.org/
news/story?id=4819597 (last visited Apr. 11, 2012) (reviewing BCS selection crite-
ria and process).
75. See id. (noting that no conference may have more than two BCS partici-
pants). This limitation, if ever challenged, may not survive anti-trust scrutiny. For
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With regards to determining which teams play where, teams
automatically obligated to play in certain bowls are awarded to
those bowls.76 Following this process, if a bowl loses a team to the
national title game it gets to pick its replacement.77 Once the
replacements for the title game teams have been selected, the bowls
select the remaining teams from the pool of automatic qualifiers
and available at large teams until all slots are filled.78 The order for
these selections rotates.79 Finally, the conferences and bowl games
may, but are not required to, adjust the pairings in bowl games pro-
vided that the Big Ten or Pac 10 champion is not removed from the
Rose Bowl.80
2. Selecting BCS Conferences
Membership in a BCS AQ conference is a major advantage on
the road to a BCS bowl game, because of the automatic berth.81
Accordingly, many top-level non-BCS teams are finding their way
into AQ conferences.82 Notably, the University of Utah ("Utah")
has left the Mountain West Conference for the Pac Ten, which with
the addition of the University of Colorado from the Big Twelve is
soon to become the Pac Twelve.83 At the same time, Texas Chris-
an anti-trust analysis of appearance restrictions, see infra notes 294-305 and accom-
panying text.
76. See BCS Selection Procedures, BCS FOOTBALL, http://www.bcsfootball.org/
news/story?id=4819597 (last visited Apr. 11, 2012) (reviewing BCS selection crite-
ria and process).
77. See id. (outlining process for replacing title game teams). The bowl losing
the number one team picks first and the bowl losing the number two team picks
second. See id. (indicating selection order).
78. See id. (reviewing selection order for BCS bids).
79. Id.
80. See id. (identifying provision allowing for matchup adjustment at option of
BCS).
81. See id. (noting AQ conferences have guaranteed access to BCS). By win-
ning the conference, a team from an automatic qualifying ("AQ") conference is
guaranteed a slot in the BCS. Id. This places their postseason destiny in their own
hands. See id. (identifying conference championship as guarantee of access to BCS
bowl game in AQ confernce). If they keep winning games, they will play in the
BCS. See id. (describing system of automatic berths). That does not mean that
non-AQ teams never receive bids to BCS games; non-AQ teams such as Utah
(twice), TCU (twice), Boise State (twice), and Hawaii (once) have all appeared in
BCS games. See BCS, Alliance, and Coalition Games Year by Year, BCS FOOTBALL,
http://www.bcsfootball.org/news/story?id=4809942 (last visited Apr. 11, 2012)
(reviewing BCS participants).
82. For examples of teams joining AQ conferences, see infra notes 83-84 and
accompanying text.
83. See Ralph D. Russo, Pac-10 Expansion: Conference Will Be Called Pac-12 Once
Utah, Colorado join, HUFFINGTON POST (ul. 27, 2010, 7:46 PM), http://www.huf-
fingtonpost.com/2010/07/27/pac0-expansion-lew-leagu-n_661402.html (noting
Utah and Colorado will be joining Pac 10).
[Vol. 19: p. 541
HeinOnline  -- 19 Vill. Sports & Ent. L.J. 554 2012
15
Ricci: The Worst Form of Championship, Except for All of the Others that
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2012
THE WORST FORM OF CHAMPIONSHIP
tian University ("TCU"), after flirting with the Big East, ultimately
agreed to leave the Mountain West to join the Big 12.84 The Big
East, hoping to remain relevant as a football conference after the
departure of the University of Pittsburgh and Syracuse for the ACC
has added several prominent football schools from non-AQ confer-
ences in an effort to remain eligible as an AQ conference.85
The irony of this trend is that the Mountain West was attempt-
ing to challenge for an automatic qualifying conference with the
addition of Boise State from the Western Athletic Conference.86
With the departure of teams such as Utah and TCU for current AQ
conferences this is now unlikely to happen.8 7 Although it is theoret-
ically possible for a conference to attain AQ status, the pattern of
defection of stronger non-AQ schools for AQ conferences makes
this unlikely in practice.88
The BCS periodically re-evaluates which conferences are auto-
matic qualifier conferences, and will do so again after the 2011 sea-
son.89 The conference looks at three factors to determine which
conferences are the automatic qualifiers.90 The first element is the
84. See Pete Thamel, With Eye on Football, Big East Adds TCU, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
30, 2010, at B11, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/30/sports/
ncaafootball/30tcu.html (reviewing implications of TCU joining Big East).
85. See Andy Katz, Big East Introduces Five New Schools, ESPN (Dec. 8, 2011, 8:28
AM), http://espn.go.com/college-sports/story/_/id/7327683/big-east-confer-
ence-introduces-boise-state-broncos-san-diego-state-aztecs-houston-cougars-smu-
mustangs-ucf-knights (discussing effect of conference realignment on the Big
East). In search of more revenue, Pittsburgh and Syracuse agreed to leave the Big
East for the ACC, while West Virginia will be leaving to join the Big 12. Id. In
addition, with Texas A&M and Missouri leaving the Big 12 for the SEC, there was
room in the Big 12 for -TCU to join as well. See id. (describing circumstances of
conference realignment).
86. See Boise State Moves to Mountain West, ESPN, http://sports.espn.go.com/
ncaa/news/story?id=5276064 (last updated Jun. 11, 2010, 9:03 PM) (noting that
Mountain West added Boise State in an effort to become AQ conference). Boise
State would ultimately join the Big East for football, beginning in 2013. See Katz,
supra note 85 (noting addition of Boise State and San Diego State for football only
with the addition of Southern Methodist University, University of Houston, and
University of Central Florida for all sports).
87. See Ray Brewer, Reports: TCUFootball Leaving Mountain West for BigEast, LAS
VEGAS SUN (Nov. 29, 2010), http://www.lasvegassun.com/news/2010/nov/29/re-
ports-tcu-football-leaving-mountain-west-big-eas/ (noting that departure of TCU
and Utah from Mountain West Conference is significant blow to conferences quest
for automatic qualifier status).
88. See, e.g., supra note 86 (identifying recent defections to AQ conferences).
89. See BCS Selection Procedures, BCS FOOTBALL, http://www.bcsfootball.org/
news/story?id=4819597 (last updatedJuly 21, 2011, 1:30 PM) (reviewing BCS selec-
tion criteria and process).
90. See AQ Evaluation Data, BCS FOOTBALL, http://www.bcsfootball.org/news/
story?id=5548401 (last updated Sept. 8, 2010) (listing data from last evaluation for
AQ status).
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average ranking of the highest ranked team in the conference.9 1
The second element is the average conference ranking according
to the BCS computer rankings. 92 The final element is the number
of conference members ranked in the top twenty-five in the BCS
standings at the end of the year.93 All these rankings are adjusted
for conference size.94
A non-AQ conference can become an AQ conference if it fin-
ishes in the top seven conferences in either the first or second fac-
tor and is at least in the top seven of the other, provided their
ranking according for factor three is at least fifty percent of the
leader.95 There is also an exemption application provision.96
91. See BCS Selection Procedures, BCS FOOTBALL, http://www.bcsfootball.org/
news/story?id=4819597 (last updatedJuly 21, 2011, 1:30 PM) (reviewing BCS selec-
tion criteria and process). For the last period of review from 2004-2007, the top
seven conferences are Pac Ten, SEC, Big Ten, Big Twelve, ACC, Big East, and
Mountain West. See AQ Evaluation Data, BCS FOOTBALL, http://www.bcsfootball.
org/news/story?id=5548401 (last updated July 21, 2011) (reviewing data from last
evaluation for AQ status).
92. See BCS Selection Procedures, BCS FooTBALL, http://www.bcsfootball.org/
news/story?id=4819597 (last updatedJuly 21, 2011, 1:30 PM) (reviewing BCS selec-
tion criteria and process). For the last period of review from 2004-2007, the top
seven conferences are Pac Ten, SEC, Big Twelve, ACC, Big Ten, Big East, and
Mountain West. See AQ Evaluation Data, BCS FooTBALL, http://www.bcsfootball.
org/news/story?id=5548401 (last updated July 21, 2011) (reviewing data from last
evaluation for AQ status).
93. See BCS Selection Procedures, BCS FOOTBALt, http://www.bcsfootball.org/
news/story?id=4819597 (last updatedJuly 21, 2011, 1:30 PM) (reviewing BCS selec-
tion criteria and process). For the last period of review from 2004-2007, the top six
conferences are all BCS conferences. See AQ Evaluation Data, BCS FOOTBALL,
http://www.bcsfootball.org/news/story?id=5548401 (last updated July 21, 2011)
(reviewing data from last evaluation for AQ status). The Western Athletic Confer-
ence is next, but only reaches the 22% threshold. See id. (reviewing AQ qualifica-
tion data).
94. See BCS Selection Procedures, BCS FoOTBALL, http://www.bcsfootball.org/
news/story?id=4819597 (last updatedJuly 21, 2011, 1:30 PM) (reviewing BCS selec-
tion criteria and process). The Mountain West Conference was in the process of
attempting to use these provisions to become an automatic qualifying conference,
when several of its members elected to join BCS conferences. See supra note 86
(noting attempt to strengthen conference by addition of Boise State to increase
chances to become AQ conference).
95. See BCS Selection Procedures, BCS FOOTBALL, http://www.bcsfootball.org/
news/story?id=4819597 (last updatedJuly 21, 2011, 1:30 PM) (reviewing BCS selec-
tion criteria and process).
96. See id. (reviewing appeals process). A conference can apply to the Presi-
dential Oversight Committee for an exemption if it finishes among the top six in
both the first two factors and if its ranking in the third is equal to or greater than
33.3% of the conference with the highest ranking in the third factor, or if it fin-
ishes among the top seven in either of the first two factors and among the top five
in the other and if its ranking in the third is equal to or greater than 33.3% of the
conference with the highest ranking in the third. See id. (stating threshold require-
ments for appeal).
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C. The Controversy
The BCS generated controversy on many fronts. Sometimes
the controversy was related to the formula used to calculate who
plays for the title, as was the case in 2003.97 The BCS responded to
this controversy by decreasing the importance of the computer
rankings.98
Other times controversy arises from questionable sections of at
large teams and of the supposed snubs which result.99 Others al-
lege that some universities are "gaming the system" when selecting
nonconference opponents.100 The public release of ballots from
97. For a discussion of the 2003 BCS controversy and its outcome, see supra
notes 40-44 and accompanying text.
98. See id. (reviewing BCS modifications made in response to 2003 split na-
tional tide). However, the changes did not prevent controversy from sticking
again the next year, when an undefeated Auburn team was denied a chance to play
for the national title despite playing in the highly competitive SEC, in favor of
undefeated USC and Oklahoma teams which were felt by some to have played a
less challenging schedule but which were ranked higher the entire season. See
Chris Low, 2004 Auburn Team Deserved Better, ESPN (June 11, 2010, 2:15 PM),
http://espn.go.com/blog/sec/post//id/1l1345/2004-auburn-team-deserved-bet-
ter (noting renewed controversy surrounding 2004 football championship). Even
amongst the BCS universities, the BCS is known to generate controversy. See Grow,
supra note 8, at 65 (noting 2004 controversy).
99. See Grow, supra note 8, at 66 (reviewing BCS "snubs" prior to 2004). Con-
troversy has followed the BCS throughout its existence. See id. (exemplifying typi-
cal BCS controversy). In 1998, an undefeated Tulane team was ranked number
eleven in the nation, but was denied an at-large bid to a BCS Bowl. See Ted Miller,
BCS System Leaves Long Trail of Wounded Victims, ESPN (May 20, 2008, 3:13 PM),
http://sports.espn.go.com/ncf/news/story?id=3403882 (listing numerous BCS
controversies). In 2001, Brigham Young University ("BYU") entered its final game
of the season undefeated, but even before the game was played BCS officials indi-
cated that regardless of the outcome of the game BYU would not be considered for
a BCS game. See Grow, supra note 8, at 66 (reviewing BCS "snubs" prior to 2004).
In 2003, Boise State, Miami of Ohio, and TCU were also all denied opportunities
to play in the BCS despite on field success. See id, (identifying non-AQ teams de-
nied BCS berths despite successful seasons). The addition of additional at-large
bids starting with the 2006 season have alleviated this problem somewhat, but inva-
riably teams will sometimes feel slighted the BCS. See Miller, supra (typifying criti-
cism of BCS tide game selections). At this point, the major criticism relates to
undefeated non-BCS conference teams being denied an appearance in the na-
tional title game in favor of BCS conference teams which had been defeated, like
in 2008 with the University of Utah and Boise State and TCU in 2009. See Grow,
supra note 8, at 68 (describing championship game "snubs" of 2008 and 2009
seasons).
100. The AQ conferences historically have a stronger schedule of conferences
opponents, as Ohio State's president has recently and controversially proclaimed.
See Ohio State Prez Disregards TCU, Boise State, ESPN (Nov. 25, 2010, 2:05 AM), http:/
/sports.espn.go.com/ncf/news/story?id=5845736 (alleging that AQ universities do
not play "little sisters of the poor" every week). Ironically, BCS universities, partic-
ularly in the Big Ten and SEC, are frequently accused of maximizing chances at
titles and BCS appearances by playing weak nonconference schedules and by refus-
ing to play the stronger non-BCS teams. See id. (noting that due to weak noncon-
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the Coaches Poll generated so much controversy that the poll has
decided to end the practice.' 0 '
Much of the controversy is related to the fact that the BCS sys-
tem makes it difficult if not impossible for non-AQ universities to
play for the national title. 102 This criticism typically arises in sea-
sons like in 2007, where a two-loss LSU team played for the national
title instead of an undefeated Hawaii team.103 The fact that LSU
won the title while Hawaii was soundly defeated by the University of
Georgia ("Georgia") did quiet this criticism somewhat, at least with
respect to that season. 104 However, non-AQ universities such as
Boise State University ("Boise State"), Utah, and TCU have gener-
ally been successful in the BCS bowls they have appeared in.105
Their success on the field continues to provide support for those
who want a playoff system which would ensure these teams a chance
to play for a tide.' 06
ference schedule Ohio State's strength is 59th most difficult in country, while
TCUs is 68th most difficult and Boise State is 73rd most difficult), see also Eddie
Dzurilla, Ohio State Football Schedule: Sisters of the Poor at Your Door, BLEACHER REPORT
(Nov. 28. 2010), http://bleacherreport.com/articles/528867-ohio-state-football-
schedule-sisters-of-the-poor-at-your-door (noting AQ universities are not eager to
play stronger non-AQ opponents in non-conference schedule). These scheduling
practices have led to charges that BCS universities are "gaming the system." See Ray
Glier, The BCS Formula: Cupcakes and Home Fields, AJC.com (Nov. 18, 2010), http://
www.ajc.com/sports/the-bcs-formula-cupcakes-745859.html (noting that AQ teams
have identified an optimum scheduling pattern for BCS success). TCU would ulti-
mately have the last laugh, defeating Big Ten representative Wisconsin in the 2011
Rose Bowl. See Andrea Adelson, Little Sisters of the Poor No More, ESPN (Jan. 3, 2011,
10 AM), http://espn.go.com/blog/ncfnation/post/-/id/37061/little-sisters-of-
the-poor-no-more (noting increased credibility gained by non-AQ universities fol-
lowing TCU's come from behind victory over Wisconsin).
101. See supra note 51 (noting end of coaches poll disclosures).
102. See Frank Deford, Broncos Get Raw Deal in NCAA's Unfair Bowl Champion-
ship Series, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Oct. 14, 2009, 2:29 PM), http://sportsillus-
trated.cnn.com/2009/writers/frank_deford/10/14/boise.state.bcs/index.html
(expressing displeasure with competitive realities of BCS system).
103. See Lass Thompson, Why Deny the Perfect Hawaii Warriors a Crack at College
Football's Greatest Prize, FANTIx.coM (Dec. 6, 2007), http://www.fanatix.com/why-
deny-perfect-hawaii-warriors/ (arguing that Hawaii deserved chance to play for na-
tional title in 2007).
104. See BCS, Alliance, and Coalition Games Year by Year, BCS FOOTBALL, http://
www.bcsfootball.org/news/story?id=4809942 (last updated Feb. 10, 2011, 5:01 PM)
(noting Hawaii lost to University of Georgia 41-10).
105. See id. (acknowledging non-AQ conference teams have winning record in
BCS bowl games). High level college football is the only NCAA sport without a
playoff system to determine a champion. See Grow, supra note 8, at 60-61 (noting
unique championship structure of high level college football).
106. See BCS, Alliance, and Coalition Games Year by Year, BGS FOOTBALL, http://
www.bcsfootball.org/news/story?id=4809942 (last updated Feb. 10, 2011, 5:01 PM)
(noting trend of on-field success for non-AQ teams in BCS bowls). As more and
more non-BCS conference teams play well in bowl games, it becomes harder and
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The most relevant controversy from a legal point of view is re-
lated to access to BCS bowl games. 10 7 There are very real financial
consequences to the greater difficulties that non-BCS universities
face in getting invitations to BCS bowl games, even before consider-
ing the unequal distribution of BCS revenue.108 Non-BCS universi-
ties and conferences would obviously like greater access to the
riches generated by the BCS, but are prevented from doing so by
the structure of the BCS.109 This controversy spurs the threat of
lawsuits. 110
III. APPLICABLE ANTI-TRUST LAWS
The anti-trust laws, specifically the Sherman Anti-Trust Act,
provide a framework for analyzing the BCS from a business perspec-
tive.1 1' However, the law does acknowledge that college sports in-
harder to claim that all non-BCS teams are greatly inferior to BCS conference
teams. See id. (listing non-AQ BCS victories).
107. The access issue is strongly tied to the financial issues which underlie the
BCS dispute. See id. (exemplifying prevelance of AQ teams in BCS bowls). For a
discussion of the financial implications of diminished access and uneven revenue
distribution see infra notes 193-198 and accompanying text.
108. See 2010-2011 College Bowl Game Schedule, COLLEGE FOOTBALL POLL, http:/
/www.collegefootballpoll.com/bowl-games_bowl_schedule.html (last visited Apr.
11, 2012) (listing conference ties, dates, scores, and payouts of bowl games follow-
ing 2010 season). BCS bowl games pay out $17,000,000 to their participants. See
id. (reviewing bowl payments to participants). For the sake of comparison, the
Liberty Bowl pays out 1/10th this amount. Id. Historically, college bowl games
determine the financial payout to participating teams. See Grow, supra note 8, at 88
(describing historical practice for setting bowl game financial rewards for partici-
pants). The BCS, by bundling the rights to all BCS games together, have effec-
tively set a uniform price scale for member bowl games. See id. (noting uniformity
of BCS payouts).
109. See supra note 86-88 and accompanying text (explaining how one way
conferences try to gain access to these riches is by attempting to become automatic
qualifier conferences, as discussed. For an overview of the process of becoming an
automatic qualifier conference); supra notes 81-96 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing BCS eligibility).
110. See Grow, supra note 8, at 68 (noting both Department of Justice and
Utah Attorney General are considering anti-trust lawsuits).
111. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2004) ("Every contract, combination in the form of
trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the
several States, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be illegal. Every per-
son who shall make any contract or engage in any combination or conspiracy
hereby declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction
thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding $100,000,000 if a corporation, or,
if any other person, $1,000,000, or by imprisonment not exceeding 10 years, or by
both said punishments, in the discretion of the court."); see also 15 U.S.C. § 2
(2004) ("Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or com-
bine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the
trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be
deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine
not exceeding $100,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any other person, $1,000,000,
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volve unique considerations that courts may consider.112 The anti-
trust laws in the college context were analyzed in the landmark case
of NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma,' 1 3 a case that
provides important clues as to how a court might analyze an anti-
trust challenge to the BCS.11 4
A. General Anti-Trust Principals
The Sherman Anti-Trust Act is the principal anti-trust law at
issue with potential challenges to the BCS. It prohibits any unrea-
sonable contracts, combinations, and conspiracies in restraint of
trade. 15 When analyzing restraints on trade courts following "rule
of reason" analysis principles, first look to see if there are anti-com-
petitive effects arising out of the challenged practice.116 Once this
is established, the defendant must provide a pro-competitive justifi-
cation for his or her conduct.' 17 Then, the court must engage in a
balancing test. If the pro-competitive benefits of the challenged
practice outweigh its anti-competitive effects and cannot be accom-
plished through a less restrictive alternative, it will be permitted."i8
The Sherman Anti-Trust Act also prohibits monopolization." 9
The mere possession of monopoly power is not a violation of the
Sherman Act.o20 However, if the monopoly power is used in an
or by imprisonment not exceeding 10 years, or by both said punishments, in the
discretion of the court.").
112. See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 86 (1984)
(applying Sherman Act in college sports case). For an example of a collegiate
application of the Sherman Act, see infra notes 141-148 and accompanying text.
113. 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
114. See id. (holding the NCAA violated Sherman Act).
115. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 59 (1911) (establishing
rule of reason for anti-trust cases); see also Grow, supra note 8, at 72-73 ("The rule
of reason . . . generally involves a three-step process. First, the court will require
the plaintiff to prove that the challenged restraint has an adverse effect on compe-
tition in a relevant market. Second, should the plaintiff succeed, the burden shifts
to the defendant to demonstrate that the restraint possesses procompetitive bene-
fits. Finally, if the defendant successfully establishes that that the restraint has sig-
nificant redeeming competitive qualities, the court will finally consider whether
the asserted procompetitive benefits could be achieved through less restrictive
means.").
116. See Grow, supra note 8, at 72 (stating three-step process for section 1
Sherman Act cases).
117. See id. (stating second step for analysis of Sherman Act cases).
118. See id. at 72-73 (stating third step for analysis of Sherman Act cases).
119. See 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2004) (laying out Sherman Act prohibition against
monopolization).
120. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 427 (2d Cir.
1945) (stating that possession of monopoly power alone is not offense under Sher-
man Act).
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anti-competitive manner or if the monopoly was acquired using
anti-competitive practices, there is a Sherman Act violation.121 Mo-
nopolists generally do not have a duty to deal with competitors. 122
However, there are some exceptional factual situations where a mo-
nopolist, by refusing to deal with a competitor, is committing an
anti-trust violation.123
Market definition is a key first step in any monopolization anal-
ysis. The recent Department of Justice Merger Guidelines ("DOJ
Merger Guidelines") provide a methodology for defining a market
for anti-trust analysis.1 2 4 First, take a product and ask if a hypotheti-
cal monopolist in that product can profitably institute a small, non-
transitory price increase, or a small permanent increase in price.125
If yes, then this product is the market.126 If not, add the next clos-
est substitute for the product to the "market" and repeat the
process.' 27
In general, contracts combinations or conspiracies needed to
create new products or services which would otherwise be unavaila-
ble are generally held to be permissible. 28 The Chicago Board of
Trade fixes the price of certain commodities when the exchange is
not operating, and this is permissible because of the strong pro-
121. See, e.g., Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,
574 (1986) (exemplifying case where alleged exclusionary conduct took form of
artificially low prices).
122. See Verizon v. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 399 (2004) (noting monopolists gen-
erally have no obligation to cooperate with competitors). There are also the five
elements of the essential faculties doctrine to consider which are: (1) whenever
competitors jointly create a useful facility, (2) that is essential to the competitive
vitality of rivals, (3) and (perhaps) essential to the competitive vitality of the mar-
ket, (4) and admission of rivals is consistent with the legitimate purposes of the
venture, then (5) the collaborators must admit rivals on relatively equal terms. See
id. at 411 ("It suffices for present purposes to note that the indispensable require-
ment for invoking the doctrine is the unavailability of access to the "essential facili-
ties"; where access exists, the doctrine serves no purpose."). While it might seem
on one hand that this applies to the BCS, the availability of access of non-BCS
teams to the games, as discussed supra note 69, defeats this analysis. See BCS Selec-
tion Procedures, supra note 69 (discussing non-BCS teams).
123. See Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 586
(1985) (holding that conduct of dominant player in Aspen Skiing market consti-
tuted anti-trust violation). Aspen Skiing, discussed infra notes 208-209, is an exam-
ple of an exception to the rule.
124. See Horizontal Merger Guidelines, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, Aug. 19, 2010,
available at http://wwwjustice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg-2010.pdf [herein-
after Merger Guidelines] (establishing guidelines for review of Mergers).
125. See id. (describing first step of "hypothetical monopolist" test).
126. See id. (identifying second step of"hypothetical monopolist" test).
127. See id. (outlinging third step of "hypothetical monopolist" test).
128. See infra notes 129-130 (providing examples of permissible contracts
combinations or conspiracies).
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competitive benefits of the exchange and the necessity of these ar-
rangements for the exchange to operate.129 Blanket licensing
agreements for music rights are also permissible because, while they
do "fix" the price of the right to use certain subsets of intellectual
property, the massive reductions in transaction costs that such
agreements provide are very pro-competitive."' 0
B. NCAA v. Board of Regents of University of Oklahoma
College football has previously been the subject of a major
anti-trust lawsuit. 13' Unhappy with NCAA restrictions on broadcasts
of their games, the Universities of Oklahoma and Georgia brought
suit under the Sherman Act to eliminate these restrictions.13 2 The
Supreme Court held in a seven to two decision that the broadcast
restrictions were an unreasonable restraint on trade and were
therefore impermissible under the Sherman Act.'33 This case fea-
tures many parallels to the deeper issues underlying the controversy
of the BCS and provides guidance for how a court may view such a
lawsuit.'3 4
1. Background
In the early 1980s, NCAA television broadcasts were subject to
appearance restrictions.'3 Only a limited number of broadcasts
were allowed on a given weekend, and teams could only appear on
television a certain number of times.136 Unhappy with these restric-
129. See Chi. Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 239 (1918) (holding
that overnight price fixing as necessary condition of establishing exchange was
permissible under Sherman Act because of precompetitive benefit).
130. See Broad. Music v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 441 U.S. 1, 1-2 (1979) [herein-
after BMI] (upholding blanket music license agreements as reasonable restraints
of trade under Sherman Act). For further discussion of the BMI case as it relates
to the BCS, see infra notes 219-221 and accompanying text.
131. See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 136 (1984)
[hereinafter NCAA v. Board of Regents] (invalidating restrictions on broadcast of
college football games).
132. See id. at 85-86 (stating facts of case).
133. See id. (ruling in favor of plaintiff-appellee).
134. For an application of the lessons of NCAA v. Board of Regents to the BCS,
see infra notes 155-159 and accompanying text.
135. See NCAA, 468 U.S. at 89-90 (describing appearance restrictions). The
television plan first appeared in 1951, and was modified several times subse-
quently. Id. The incarnation challenged in 1981 among other things required
that at least eighty-two different member institutions must appear, and no team
may appear on television more than six times or more than four times nationally in
one year. See id. at 94 (describing challenged version of NCAA rights plan at issue
in Supreme Court case).
136. See id. (discussing broadcasting of games before suit).
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tions, a group of major college football teams, including the Uni-
versity of Georgia and the University of Oklahoma, formed the
College Football Association ("CFA") to collectively negotiate televi-
sion rights for broadcasting their games.' 37 The NCAA threatened
to issue sanctions on these universities in response, not just in foot-
ball but in all sports.138 Georgia and Oklahoma responded by suing
under the antitrust laws, arguing that the restrictions were unrea-
sonable restraints of trade.139 The case ultimately reached the Su-
preme Court.1 40
2. Analysis and Outcome
Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, held that the chal-
lenged broadcast restraints were unreasonable output restric-
tions.141 Stevens acknowledged that a league governing body was
necessary to allow college football games to take place.142 However,
he refused to extend this body enough power to support an output
restriction of this scale. 143 Protecting the live gate was rejected as a
pro competitive justification, because one cannot suppress competi-
tion in one area to make another product more competitive.144
Stevens acknowledged that maintenance of competitive bal-
ance is a valid issue in the context of college football. 145 His rejec-
tion of this defense here was because the challenged restrictions
137. See id. at 94-95 (noting formation of CFA for collective bargaining
purposes).
138. See id. at 95 (detailing NCAA's response to formation of CFA).
139. See id. at 96 (reviewing district court's findings in favor of plaintiff). At
the time, this case was much more adventurous than it may appear in hindsight,
because on two occasions NCAA restrictions intended to preserve competitive bal-
ance survived anti-trust challenges. See Hennessey v. NCAA, 564 F.2d 1136, 1154
(5th Cir. 1977) (upholding restriction on size of coaching staffs as reasonable re-
straint of trade); Justice v. NCAA, 577 F. Supp. 356, 384 (D. Ariz. 1983) (holding
that preventing colleges from paying student athletes was a reasonable restraint of
trade in light of goals of NCAA).
140. NCAA, 468 U.S. at 96.
141. See id. at 120 (ruling against the NCAA). The BCS may be vulnerable
under the same theory. For an evaluation of the BCS as an unreasonable output
restriction, see infra notes 294-311 and accompanying text.
142. See NCAA, 468 U.S. at 101 ("Rather, what is critical is that this case in-
volves an industry in which horizontal restraints on competition are essential if the
product is to be available at all.").
143. See id. at 115 ("[T]here is no need for collective action in order to enable
the product to compete against its nonexistent competitors.").
144. See id. at 117 ("By seeking to insulate live ticket sales from the full spec-
trum of competition because of its assumption that the product itself is insuffi-
ciently attractive to consumers, petitioner forwards a justification that is
inconsistent with the basic policy of the Sherman Act.").
145. See id. ("Petitioner argues that the interest in maintaining a competitive
balance among amateur athletic teams is legitimate and important and that itjusti-
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were not properly tailored to support that interest. 146 He specifi-
cally noted that the challenged restrictions were not spending re-
strictions on coaching salaries or facilities expenditures, suggesting
that some restraints on trade necessary to preserve a competitive
balance might be permissible. 14 7 Following this case the NCAA
could no longer control the broadcast of college football to the de-
gree it had previously. This case meant an end to appearance re-
strictions, leading to an explosion of college football on
television.14 8
3. Importance to Future Rulings on the BCS
While the composition of the court has changed since the early
1980s, the pattern of analysis used in this case is still a useful guide
for courts presented with a challenge to the BCS. Most notably,
NCAA v. Board of Regents of University of Oklahoma established the
rule of reason as the standard of review in the context of collegiate
athletics.149
fies the regulations challenged in this case. We agree with the first part of the
argument but not the second.").
146. See id. (noting restrictions lacked appropriate connection with maintain-
ing a competitive balance).
147. See id. at 119 ("The television plan is not even arguably tailored to serve
such an interest. It does not regulate the amount of money that any college may
spend on its football program, nor the way in which the colleges may use the reve-
nues that are generated by their football programs . . . ."). Restrictions in these
areas have an interesting legal history under the anti-trust laws. Restrictions on the
size of coaching staff have been upheld in the past. See supra note 139 (reviewing
Hennessey ruling). But restrictions on coaching salaries were later found to be un-
reasonable restraints of trade. See Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1024 (10th Cir.
1998) (holding that college coaching salary restrictions were an unreasonable re-
straint of trade).
148. See 2011 College Football TV Schedule, PREMIER COLLEGE FOOTBALL Jan.22,
2011), http://www.premiercollegefootball.com/index.php?option=com-content&
view=article&id=85&Itemid=111 (listing scheduled college football broadcasts for
2011 season). As of February 24, 2011, a total of 594 college football games were
scheduled to be broadcast in the 2011 college football season. See id. (exemplify-
ing prevalence of televisted college football since NCAA).
149. See NCAA, 468 U.S. at 100-01 (noting decision to apply rule of reason "is
not based on a lack of judicial experience with this type of arrangement, on the
fact that the NCAA is organized as a nonprofit entity, or on our respect for the
NCAA's historic role in the preservation and encouragement of intercollegiate am-
ateur athletics. Rather, what is critical is that this case involves an industry in which
horizontal restraints on competition are essential if the product is to be available at
all."). The court identified the rule of reason as applicable because of the unique
nature of league sports, which requires some cooperation amongst competitors to
ensure the availability of the product. See id. (reviewing antitrust conundrum
posed by league sports). In the context of an NCAA case, the rule of reason analy-
sis requires that a court only recognizes justifications "necessary to produce com-
petitive intercollegiate sports" as legitimate rationales for practices with anti-
competitive effects. See Warmbrod, supra note 8, at 367 (noting additional consid-
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This standard is more lenient than others which might be em-
ployed, and gives the NCAA and accordingly the BCS more leeway
in imposing restrictions.s15 o Although a court might choose to em-
ploy a different standard of review, courts since the late 1970s have
moved towards a more pervasive use of the rule of reason to better
account for the possibility that practices which in the past have
been deemed per se illegal may in fact have substantial pro competi-
tive benefits upon further inquiry.15 1
The Supreme Court's acknowledgement of the protection of
competitive balance as a legitimate interest is significant.1 5 2 A fu-
ture litigant can frame an argument that the BCS skews competitive
balance by making it harder for teams from non-AQ conferences to
reach the major bowl games.153 The economic disparity between
BCS bowls and other bowls is significant and increases the difficul-
ties non-BCS universities face in competing with BCS universities. 1 5 4
erations in rule of reason analysis in collegiate context). Accordingly, a case can
still be made that a per se approach, or a prohibition of conduct without further
inquiry, might be the appropriate standard in the aftermath of the NCAA v Board of
Regents decision and the ensuring expansion of the business aspects of college foot-
ball. See Nw. Wholesale Stationers Inc., v. Pac. Stationary & Printing Co., 427 U.S.
284, 294 (1985) (discussing appropriateness of per se approach). In a business con-
text, the Supreme Court has indicated that in group boycott cases, a per se rule was
appropriate where a firm was cutting off access to supplies or inputs necessary for a
boycotted firm to compete. See id. (noting when per se rule is appropriate). While
this argument could certainly be made about the BCS, the Supreme Court also
indicated that plausible pro competitive justifications, like the creation of a na-
tional championship game, could rebut the rationale for application of per se re-
view. See id. (reviewing circumstances when per se rule analysis is appropriate).
Furthermore, it can be argued by the BCS that the maximization of revenue from
revenue sports like college football and men's college basketball is essential not
only to support these sports but all NCAA sports. See Matthew Peaslee, Nonrevenue
Sports Hanging on Despite Conference Changes, DAILY ATHENAEUM (June 22, 2010),
http://www.thedaonline.com/sports/non-revenue-sports-hanging-on-despite-con-
ference-changes-1.1493874 (describing relationships between revenue and non-
revenue sports at West Virginia University ("WVU") sand acknowledging role of
football and men's basketball in financing WVU athletic department).
150. See NCAA, 468 U.S. at 101-02 (noting some restrictions are required to
ensure the unique product of college football is available at all).
151. See infra note 188 (reviewing case law on vertical restraints of trade). The
gradual application of the rule of reason as opposed to restrictive per se rules in
cases involving vertical restraints in a supply chain is emblematic of this trend. See
id. (exemplifying evolution of antitrust law over time to reflect new views of under-
lying economics of challenged restraints on trade).
152. See supra note 145 (acknowledging importance of protecting competitive
balance).
153. For a review of the BCS selection procedures and the difficulties a non-
AQ team has in being selected, see supra notes 61-80 and accompanying text.
154. See Schmit, supra note 8, at 244-245 (noting the importance of facilities
to recruiting efforts). Since college football players cannot be paid, teams com-
pete for hiring top coaching talents and by building lavish facilities to entice re-
cruits to attend. See Leon Stafford, College Sports Arms Race Not Sustainable, Say
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Although Justice Stevens emphasized that none of the chal-
lenged restrictions related to expenditures on college football, it is
clear that he was open to restraints protecting the competitive bal-
ance in college football.155 The explosion in television revenue
which followed the decision in NCAA has substantially changed the
nature of college football in some ways which arguably vindicate the
arguments made by the NCAA in the early 1980s.156 While one
reading of NCAA is that any NCAA restrictions on income genera-
tion are not related to protection of competitive balance, this
stance could be re-evaluated in light of new evidence of the effect
of increased revenue on college athletics.'57 NCAA v. Board of Re-
gents of the University of Oklahoma serves as a reminder that college
football is a business, and is not beyond the reach of the antitrust
laws.s58 This proposition is now truer than ever, considering the
massive amounts of revenue generated by the BCS and other bowl
games. 59
IV. ANTI-TRUST ANALYSIS
Generally, the BCS in its current incarnation is likely to survive
challenge under the anti-trust laws.' 6 0 Even if a violation is found,
University Presidents, ATLANTA J. CONST. (Jan. 12, 2010, 7:56 PM), http://www.ajc.
com/sports/college-sports-arms-race-273700.html (noting increase in coach pay to
keep programs competitive). A small scale arms race in these areas has ensued
amongst major college football programs. See id. (noting strain that college foot-
ball arms race is placing on university budgets).
155. See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 119-20 (1984)
(noting television plan did not restrict spending by universities on football
programs).
156. See id. at 118-19 (1984) ("The interest in maintaining a competitive bal-
ance that is asserted by the NCAA as a justification for regulating all television of
intercollegiate football is not related to any neutral standard or to any readily iden-
tifiable group of competitors."). The NCAA advanced the argument in 1984 that
the television rights plan was essential to ensuring that competitive balance was not
unduly upset by allowing more popular teams to rapidly expand their revenue
sources to the point where it deprives other teams of an opportunity to compete.
See id. at 119 (reviewing NCAA's competitive balance argument).
157. See Stafford, supra note 154 (noting effects of uneven revenue distribu-
tion on collegiate athletics arms race). See also Peaslee, supra note 149 (describing
impact and importance of football revenue on entire athletic department).
158. See NCCA, 468 U.S. at 120 (finding that college football is not outside
purview of Sherman Antitrust Act).
159. See 2010-2011 College Bowl Game Schedule, supra note 108 (reviewing bowl
payouts).
160. For a discussion of a potential group boycott claim, see infra notes 189-
265 and accompanying text. For a review of a potential monopolization claim, see
infta notes 266-277 and accompanying text. For an analysis of a potential illegal
tying claim, see infra notes 278-291 and accompanying text. The strongest claim
against the BCS may be brought from within the BCS itself, by BCS teams and
conferences looking to expand their own power by eliminating the BCS confer-
HeinOnline  -- 19 Vill. Sports & Ent. L.J. 566 2012
27
Ricci: The Worst Form of Championship, Except for All of the Others that
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2012
THE WORST FOlM OF CHAMPIONSHIP
it is difficult to imagine exactly what remedy a successful plaintiff
could obtain, or if such a remedy would actually benefit college
football.161 Any such lawsuit would likely be meant to strengthen
the negotiating position of the party which brought the suit.16 2
A. Threshold Questions
In every anti-trust action, definition of the market is critical.
How a market is defined could mean the difference between win-
ning and losing an anti-trust case.163 Market definition has two as-
pects. The first is determining what products and services
constitute the relevant market for the purposes of monopolization
claims.' 64 The second is identifying the players in the market, both
horizontally and vertically, to understand the competitive effects of
challenged restrictions in the context of the industry.165
1. Defining the Market
There are several potential ways to define the market for the
purposes of a BCS anti-trust lawsuit. The market could be defined
as the market for a national championship game, but this is likely
too narrow a market as there are four non-championship BCS
ence appearance restrictions. See Chris Smith, The Business Implications of Proposed
BCS Playoff Changes, FoRBES (Apr. 5, 2012 9:18 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
chrissmith/2012/04/05/the-business-implications-of-proposed-bcs-playoff-
changes/ (reviewing potential upcoming changes to BCS). For an evaluation of
this proposition as an anticompetitive restriction on output, see infra notes 294-307
and accompanying text.
161. For a review of the difficulties in obtaining a satisfactory remedy in a BCS
antitrust suit, see infra notes 312-339 and accompanying text.
162. See Florio, supra note 10 (reviewing history of NFL antitrust litigation as a
tactic for obtaining leverage in negotiations). This is how antitrust litigation is
used in the collective bargaining process. See id. (describing relationship between
antitrust lawsuit outcomes and bargaining leverage in history of NFL labor rela-
tions). The NFLPA has successfully decertified as a union and won major antitrust
case victories in the courts, giving them the leverage necessary to negotiate
favorable labor agreements as a settlement to the antitrust litigation. See, e.g.,
Brown v. Pro Football Inc., 518 U.S. 231 (1996) (exemplifying NFL anti-trust law-
suit litigated up to United States Supreme Court); White v. Nat'l Football League,
836 F. Supp. 1458 (D. Minn 1993) (holding that NFL had committed an anti-trust
violation); McNeil v. Nat'l Football League, 790 F. Supp. 871 (D. Minn. 1992) (in-
validating "Plan B" free agency as an anti-trust violation).
163. See United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 424-25 (2d Cir.
1945) (attempting to define market for aluminum and recognizing importance of
defining market in antitrust suit).
164. See infra notes 166-183 and accompanying text for BCS market definition
analysis.
165. For a helpful analogy of the upstream and downstream participants in
the college football "industry" as a vertically integrated joint venture, see infra
notes 184-188 and accompanying text.
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bowls. 166 The market could also be defined as all bowl games, but
this is likely too broad because some bowl games are inherently
more valuable than others as measured by broadcast ratings. 167
Such a definition would be an excellent present day example of
what commentators call the "cellophane fallacy."1 68 Neither an
166. See infra note 167 (listing BCS Bowl Games' television ratings). Based on
the television ratings, these four bowls might, by themselves, constitute a separate
market. See id. (noting general superiority of BCS game ratings). Market segmen-
tation is an inherently difficult exercise and is often the subject of intense disputes
in litigation. See, e.g., Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d at 422-27 (exemplifying
controversy over market definition in case involving aluminum ingots and noting
defeat in case because defendant failed to convince court to adopt its proposed
market definition ).
167. The following table summarizes ratings of the BCS bowls and the highest
rated non-BCS bowl from 2006-2010:
Ratings of BCS Bowls and Highest Non-BCS Bowl by Year
2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 Avgas Max Min Var Sdev
Championship 15.29 17.17 15.80 14.40 17.40 16.01 17.40 14.40 1.61 1.27
Rose Bowl 11.26 13.18 11.70 7.40 6.98 10.10 13.18 6.98 7.60 2.76
Fiesta Bowl 6.15 8.23 10.40 11.11 13.94 9.97 13.94 6.15 8.72 2.95
Sugar Bowl 8.20 8.50 7.80 7.00 9.29 8.16 9.29 7.00 0.72 0.85
Orange Bowl 6.75 6.80 5.40 7.70 8.40 7.01 8.40 5.40 1.28 1.13
Non-BCS Bowl High 7.05 6.83 6.40 9.13 5.99 7.08 9.13 5.99 1.48 1.22
See TVRatings: 2010-2011 Bowl Game TVRatings, BCS FOOTBALL (Feb. 28, 2011, 5:47
PM), http://www.bcsfootball.org/news/story?id=4819384 (providing source data
for above chart).
Prominent Non-BCS Bowl Ratings by Year
2010 2009 2008 2007 2006 Avg Max Min Var Sdev
Capital One 3.69 6.83 6.4 9.13 5.81 6.372 9.13 3.69 3.83 1.96
Outback 7.05 4.06 3.1 3.37 4.36 4.388 7.05 3.1 2.47 1.57
Cotton 5.81 4.54 4.4 3.5 3.7 4.39 5.81 3.5 0.83 0.91
Chick-fil-a 5.02 4.9 3.9 5.09 4.78 4.738 5.09 3.9 0.23 0.48
Holliday 4.04 4.31 4.6 4.38 4.11 4.288 4.6 4.04 0.05 0.22
Id. "Variance" is a measure of the unpredictability of a variable, with a higher value
indicating unpredictability. See Glossary of Statistical Terms, STATISTICS BERKELEY,
http://statistics.berkeley.edu/-stark/SticiGui/Text/gloss.htm (last visited Apr. 12,
2012) (defining relevant statistical terms, notably "variance"). "Standard devia-
tion" is a measure of how far from the mean a variable can be expected to stray,
with lower standard deviations indicating less predictability. See id. (defining "stan-
dard deviation").
168. See United States v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours 7 Co., 351 U.S. 377, 400
(1956) [hereinafter Cellophane] (concluding that where increase in price in one
product increased demand for another substitute product, products were a part of
same market). The "cellophane paradox" is that sometimes demand for the "sub-
stitutes" increases because the super-competitive price of the preferred product
makes otherwise uncompetitive products appealing. See also George W. Stocking &
Willard F. Meuller, The Cellophane Case and the New Competition, AM. EcoN. REV.
(PAPERS & PRoc.) 1, at 29 (1955), available at http://hubcap.clemson.edu/
-sauerr/classes/899/readings/stocking.cellophane.pdf (setting forth "cello-
phane fallacy" in landmark study).
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economist nor a college football fan would claim that the Meineke
Car Care Bowl is really a substitute for the Rose Bowl. 169
The correct market definition is likely the market for high-level
college football bowl games. 170 This market would include not only
the BCS games but also other high-level bowl games.171 There are
several bowl games, most notably the Capital One Bowl, which rou-
tinely draw television ratings comparable to BCS games. 7 2 On the
formation of the BCS, bowl games competed to become a part of
the new organization, with those holding the most lucrative confer-
ence tie-ins ultimately joining.17 3 Those bowl games not selected to
169. See 2010-2011 College Bowl Game Schedule, supra note 108 (reviewing bowl
payouts). The difference in payouts between the two is $15.4MM. Id.
170. See Nielson Television Measurement, NIELSON, http://www.nielsen.com/us/
en/measurement/television-measurement.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2012)
(describing process for compiling television ratings). For the purpose of defining
the market for this article, television ratings are used as a proxy for business value
of the bowl games because a higher television rating indicates a higher percentage
of the television viewing public is watching a program at a given time. See id. (iden-
tifying underlying meaning of television ratings).
171. See TVRatings, supra note 167 (reviewing bowl ratings). The Capital One
Bowl and to a lesser extent the Outback Bowl periodically challenge and surpass
individual BCS games in television ratings. See id. (displaying tendancy of some
bowl game ratings to periodically outperform BCS bowl game ratings). The Capi-
tal One Bowl is arguably the one non-BCS bowl that is truly competitive with the
BCS bowls in television ratings. See id. (demonstrating strong performance of Cap-
ital One Bowl). It should be noted that the Sugar Bowl, which receives the SEC
champion, is the most consistent in the ratings of the BCS games, and that the
addition of Big Ten Teams such as Ohio State, Michigan, or Penn State seem to
draw additional viewership for bowls which feature them. See id. (reviewing bowl
ratings); see also 2010-2011 College Bowl Game Schedule infra note 174 (reviewing con-
ference ties to bowls). As in all anti-trust cases, especially monopolization cases,
market definition is important. See Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d at 422-27
(exemplifying importance of market definition). If the court chooses to define
the market more narrowly, with just the four BCS games, the failure of the BCS to
include non-BCS teams when selecting at-large berths could make it more difficult
to argue that there was no exclusionary conduct. See Rodgers, supra note 8, at 299-
300 (noting that past conduct could be probative of antitrust violation by BCS
bowls).
172. See TV Ratings: 2010-2011 Bowl Game TVRatings, BCS FOOTBALL (Feb. 28,
2011, 5:47 PM), http://www.bcsfootball.org/news/story?id=4819384 (reviewing
TV ratings for college football bowl games from 2002-present). For example in
2010 the Capital One Bowl had a higher TV rating than the Orange Bowl that year.
Id.
173. See BCS Chronology, BCS FOOTBALL, (Jan. 21, 2010, 3:28 PM), http://www.
bcsfootball.org/news/story?id=4819366 (describing process of creation of BCS in-
cluding negotiations to determine member bowl games). The bowls with the con-
ference tie-ins, who were the most powerful football conferences at the time,
became the Bowl Coalition. See id. (recounting history of Bowl Coalition). At one
point, the Cotton Bowl was a member of the Bowl Coalition before being replaced
by the Fiesta Bowl. See id. (describing changing membership of BCS predecessor).
2012] 569
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be a part of the BCS continued under the old system of contractual
ties to certain conferences.17 4
As noted earlier, television ratings are a useful approximation
of the relative value of bowl game broadcasting rights, the chief
source of revenue for the BCS.17 5 An analysis of these ratings pro-
vides a view into the relationships between the market participants.
In general, the ratings of BCS bowl games and bowl games in gen-
eral are strongly correlated.17 6 However, there is an inverse rela-
174. See 2010-2011 College Bowl Schedule, ESPN, http://sports.espn.go.com/
ncf/news/story?id=5168379 (last visited Apr. 12, 2012) (listing conference ties,
dates, scores, and payouts of bowl games following 2011 season). Even outside of
the BCS, conference tie-ins to bowl games are an important part of college foot-
ball. See id. (reviewing automatic paths to bowl games based on conference mem-
bership and record). For example, the Capital One Bowl uses its ties to the SEC
and Big Ten to secure matchups which often surpass BCS games in television rat-
ings performance. See id. (noting Capital One Bowl receives 2nd place teams from
SEC and Big Ten); see also 7VRatings, supra note 167 (documenting ratings success
of Capital One Bowl). In 2007, only the Fiesta Bowl and National Title game were
more heavily watched than the Capital One Bowl. Id. That year, the Capital One
Bowl featured the University of Michigan and the University of Florida in the final
game of Michigan coach Lloyd Carr. See Mike Mitchell, Michigan Gives Carr a Win-
ning Sendoff COLLEGE FOOTBALL POLL (Jan. 1, 2008), http://www.collegefoot-
ballpoll.com/bowl-recap-2007_capital%20one.html (reviewing Capital One Bowl
game between University of Florida and University of Michigan).
175. See Hampp, infra note 182 (reviewing recent broadcasting deal).
176. See TV Ratings: 2010-2011 Bowl Game 7VRatings, BCS FOOTBALL (Feb. 28,
2011, 5:47 PM), http://www.bcsfootball.org/news/story?id=4819384 (providing
raw data for statistical analysis). The following table sets forth the correlations
between BCS and non-BCS broadcast ratings. Correlation is a statistical measure
which indicates how two variables interact in relation to one another. See Basic
Statistics: Correlations, STAT SoF-r, http://www.statsoft.com/textbook/basic-statis-
tics/#Correlations (last visited Apr. 12, 2012) (explaining statistical concept of cor-
relation). A correlation factor of negative one indicates an inverse relationship
between the two variables. Id Conversely, a correlation factor of zero suggests the
variables are not related. Id.
Correlations
BCS Ratings Avg/Bowl Ratings Avg 0.87
BCS High/Bowl Ratings Avg 0.93
Non-BCS Avg/Bowl Ratings Avg 0.75
Non-BCS High/Bowl Ratings Avg -0.63
BCS Ratings/Non-BCS Ratings 0.35
BCS High/Non-BCS High -0.80
Non-BCS High/BCS Ratings Avg -0.72
TV Ratings: 2010-2011 Bowl Game TV Ratings, BCS FOOTBALL (Feb. 28, 2011, 5:47
PM), http://www.bcsfootball.org/news/story?id=4819384 (providing raw data for
statistical analysis). Of particular note is that while there is a strong positive corre-
lation between the BCS ratings and the bowl ratings in general, there is an inverse
relationship between the BCS ratings and the ratings for the highest rated non-
BCS games. See id. (demonstrating correlations between bowl game ratings). This
strongly suggests that should the BCS fail to create the most compelling matchups
for the television audience, then viewers will choose to watch non-BCS bowls. See id
(demonstrating relationships in television ratings between different bowls).
[Vol. 19: p. 541
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tionship between the performance of BCS bowl games and the
highest rated non-BCS games, meaning when BCS ratings are
lower, premier non-BCS games receive higher ratings."77
Such a relationship suggests that the primary drivers of televi-
sion ratings for college football are the participating teams. 78
Teams with large devoted fan bases such as Penn State, the Univer-
sity of Florida ("Florida"), and Michigan will draw substantial inter-
est to bowl games they are participants in, BCS or otherwise.'79
Returning to the DOJ guidelines, could a hypothetical monopolist
who owns all the rights to the top-level bowl games, including not
just the BCS but also the Capital One Bowl, profitably institute a
small, non-transitory price increase?180 The answer to this question
is most likely yes.
The market for broadcast rights to college football bowl games
is a vibrant one, but experience with the BCS shows that if the
rights to all the most attractive bowl games were bundled together
then networks will pay a premium for the package.' 8" This effect
would only be more pronounced if more bowl games were added to
the BCS package. 82 Based upon the relative success of the Capital
One Bowl in particular, it appears that while the BCS dominates the
relevant market it does not by itself constitute it.183
177. See id. (reviewing relationships between bowl game ratings from year to
year).
178. See supra note 176 and accompanying text (suggesting that college foot-
ball fans watch most compelling matchups regardless of which bowl possesses
them).
179. See TV Ratings: 2010-2011 Bowl Game TV Ratings, BCS FoOTBALL (Feb. 28,
2011, 5:47 PM), http://www.bcsfootball.org/news/story?id=48193 84 (reviewing
television ratings and matchups). The 2010 Capital One Bowl, featuring Penn
State and LSU, had higher ratings than the Orange Bowl that year. See id. (com-
paring ratings of 2010 Orange Bowl with 2010 Capital One Bowl). The 2009 Capi-
tal One Bowl, featuring Georgia and Michigan State, had higher ratings than the
Orange Bowl that year. See id. (comparing ratings of 2009 Orange Bowl with 2010
Capital One Bowl). The 2008 Capital One Bowl, featuring Florida and Michigan,
had higher ratings than all bowl games except for the Rose Bowl and National
Championship game. See id. (Exemplifying tendency of popular teams, usually
from Big Ten and SEC, bringing higher broadcast ratings).
180. For a more detailed discussion on the merger guidelines, see supra notes
124-127 and accompanying text.
181. For a more detailed discussion of the attractiveness of the BCS package
to television networks, see infra notes 224-233 and accompanying text.
182. See Andrew Hampp, What ESPN's Winning of Bowl Championship Series
Means, ADAGE.COM (Nov. 19, 2008), http://adage.com/article/mediaworks/espn-
s-winning-bowl-championship-series-means/132714/ (noting ESPN bid $500 mil-
lion for exclusive rights to broadcast BCS games starting in 2011).
183. See supra note 167 and accompanying text (reviewing bowl game ratings
from 2006-2010). Several bowl games, most notably the Capital One Bowl but also
the Outback Bowl, periodically surpass less popular BCS games in ratings. See id.
5712012]
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2. Market Participants
The high-level college bowl game market has many interde-
pendent participants. It is helpful to think of these relationships in
terms of upstream and downstream manufacturing of a product,
high-level college football bowl games. The "suppliers" of this foot-
ball factory are the various NCAA football conferences as well as
college football independents.184 These conferences supply "raw
materials" in the form of individual college football teams. The
"factories" are the individual bowl games. Their products-college
football games-are then sold to the "end consumers," of which the
television networks who purchase broadcast rights are the most
important.18 5
The BCS plays the role of a vertically integrated joint venture
that produces college football games and markets them to end con-
sumers.'86 It has contracts with the "suppliers" to supply its five
"factories" with "raw materials", and then sells its "products" as a
bundled package to television networks.1 87 The NCAA functions
(explaining that lesser known bowl games have been posting higher television rat-
ings than popular BCS bowl games).
184. See NCAA FBS (Division I-A) Football Standings - 2011, ESPN, http://
espn.go.com/college-football/standings (last visited Apr. 12, 2012) (reviewing
standings of all FBS conferences and records of independent programs at conclu-
sion of 2010 season). It should be noted that not all NCAA college football teams
are members of conferences. See id. (explaining existance independent college
football programs). Notre Dame is the most well-known independent, but there
are others as well. See id. (noting there are multiple independent college football
programs). Recently, BYU also elected to become an independent for football. See
id. (exemplifying BYU as independent program); see also BYUFootball Program Ready
for Its Role As Independent, USA TODAY (Aug. 17, 2011, 8:46 PM), http://www.
usatoday.com/sports/college/football/2011-08-1 7-byu-football-ready-to-go-inde-
pendent n.htm (noting BYU is planning to become independent in football).
185. See infra note 218 and accompanying text (exemplifying preference for
popular teams with enthusiastic fan bases). For the purposes of this article the live
attendance at games will not be exhaustively analyzed, because the television con-
tracts are the most valuable for the bowls and their impact is more quantifiable
and more easily compared from bowl to bowl. However, the live gate and the
associated boost to the local economy, are not factors to be underestimated.
Teams which "travel well" are often preferred in selection of at-large participants
in the BCS.
186. See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 22 (1997) (holding vertical maxi-
mum retain price maintenance agreements are analyzed under rule of reason).
Vertical restraints between upstream and downstream parties in a supply chain are
also governed by the rule of reason for the purposes of Sherman Act analysis. See
id (identifying rule of reason applicable for analyzing vertical maximum price
maintenance); see also Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S.
877, 887 (2007) (holding vertical minimum retain price maintenance agreements
are analyzed under rule of reason); Cont'l Television v. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36, 59
(1977) (holding nonprice vertical restraints are analyzed under rule of reason).
187. See Warmbrod, supra note 8, at 373 (describing role of BCS as middle-
man). Even apart from the business context, the BCS can also be described as an
[Vol. 19: p. 541
HeinOnline  -- 19 Vill. Sports & Ent. L.J. 572 2012
33
Ricci: The Worst Form of Championship, Except for All of the Others that
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2012
THE WORST FORM OF CHAMPIONSHIP
largely as a standards-setting organization. The role of the NCAA is
to govern those member suppliers to make sure their "raw materi-
als" are produced according to specified guidelines to maintain in-
terchangeability with other "raw materials" from other suppliers in
the trade organization 188
B. BCS as a Concerted Refusal to Deal
A group boycott, or a concerted refusal to deal, can be an anti-
trust violation.189 Assuming the rule of reason governs an antitrust
challenge to the BCS, the plaintiff must show an anti-competitive
organization "buying" college football from six historically successful football con-
ferences and "selling" it football fans.
188. See, e.g., Am. Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377, 411-
12 (1921) (holding sharing of price information by trade association was facilitat-
ing practice of anticompetitive price fixing scheme). Standards setting organiza-
tions can be a facilitating practice for a price fixing scheme. See id. (exemplyfing
how an industry group can engage in anticompetitive behavior). However, the
NCAA, in so far as it acts as a standards setting organization, does not act in a way
likely to draw anti-trust scrutiny. See id (contrasting with historical role of NCAA);
see also NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 101-02 (1984) (dis-
cussing NCAA competitive standards). This was explained in NCAA v Board of
Regents:
What the NCAA and its member institutions market in this case is compe-
tition itself-contests between competing institutions. Of course, this
would be completely ineffective if there were no rules on which the com-
petitors agreed to create and define the competition to be marketed. A
myriad of rules affecting such matters as the size of the field, the number
of players on a team, and the extent to which physical violence is to be
encouraged or proscribed, all must be agreed upon, and all restrain the
manner in which institutions compete. Moreover, the NCAA seeks to
market a particular brand of football-college football. The identifica-
tion of this 'product' with an academic tradition differentiates college
football from and makes it more popular than professional sports to
which it might otherwise be comparable, such as, for example, minor
league baseball. In order to preserve the character and quality of the
'product,' athletes must not be paid, must be required to attend class,
and the like. And the integrity of the 'product' cannot be preserved ex-
cept by mutual agreement; if an institution adopted such restrictions uni-
laterally, its effectiveness as a competitor on the playing field might soon
be destroyed. Thus, the NCAA plays a vital role in enabling college foot-
ball to preserve its character, and as a result enables a product to be mar-
keted which might otherwise be unavailable. In performing this role, its
actions widen consumer choice-not only the choices available to sports
fans but also those available to athletes-and hence can be viewed as
procompetitive.
Id.
189. See, e.g., Klor's v. Boradway-Hale Stores, 359 U.S. 207, 212-14 (1959)
(holding that contract restricting sale of goods to competitors was an antitrust vio-
lation); see also Fashion Originators' Guild of Am. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 312 U.S.
457, 457-68 (1941) (holding that organization cannot use a boycott to punish
those who sold competing goods based off members designs); supra note 186 and
accompanying text (noting that these cases predate the revolution in antitrust law
brought about by law and economics analysis, epitomized by the court's reversal of
5732012]
HeinOnline  -- 19 Vill. Sports & Ent. L.J. 573 2012
34
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 19, Iss. 2 [2012], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol19/iss2/5
574 VILLANOVA SPORTS & ENT. LAw JOURNAL
effect.190 The burden then shifts to the defendant to rebut the anti-
competitive effect with a pro competitive justification that out-
weighs these effects. 191
1. Anti-Competitive Effects
In the context of the BCS, a plaintiff such as a non-AQ univer-
sity or conference can argue that the system is designed to avoid
dealing with non-AQ teams on equivalent terms. Plaintiffs can
claim that by granting certain conferences automatic berths but not
others, they are discriminating against non-AQ teams and confer-
ences without a pro-competitive justification. They can characterize
appearances by non-AQ universities such as Utah, TCU, Boise State,
and Hawaii as "compliant competition." 1 9 2
The plaintiffs likely would focus on the substantial economic
inequalities in the BCS system.'93 AQ conferences dominate the
share of revenue from the BCS games, and they dominate the line-
ups in BCS bowls.194 The revenues from the BCS are not shared
its positions on vertical restraints and the rule of reason and that they might be
decided differently today although they have never been directly overruled).
190. See NCAA, 468 U.S. at 101-03 (identifying rule of reason as proper form
of analysis for antitrust analysis in college athletics). For a review of rule of reason
analysis, see supra notes 115-118 and accompanying text. But see supra note 149
and accompanying text (acknowledging alternative arguments for per se analysis).
191. See supra note 115 and accompanying text (outlining rule of reason
analysis).
192. See Steve Lohr & James Kanter, AMD-Intel Settlement Won't End Their Woes,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 13, 2009, at BI, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/
13/technology/companies/13chip.html (describing relationship between Intel
and AMD including roughly consistent market shares). The microprocessor indus-
try is an excellent example of the idea of compliant competition, in that AMD can
be considered a compliant competitor of the market leader Intel, which dominates
the market with an 80% market share. See id. (reporting on AMD-Intel settle-
ment). While AMD and Intel have longstanding anti-trust disputes, the relative
market relationship between the two has not changed. See id. (discussing competi-
tive relationship between AMD and Intel).
193. See 2009-2010 Revenue Distribution Data, BCS FOOTBALL (Jan. 25, 2010),
http://www.bcsfootball.org/news/story?id=4856975 (reviewing revenue distribu-
tion from BCS system as disclosed by BCS). For example, all the non-AQ confer-
ences combined receive $24 million while the SEC alone receives $22.2 million.
Id. The BCS guarantees all AQ conferences an annual payment of at least $19
million. See Grow, supra note 8, at 57 (noting argument of BCS critics that BCS
allows AQ universities to maintain significant advantages over non-AQ universities,
preserving competitive advantage of AQ universities on football field). However,
at at least a certain level membership in a AQ conference is also prestige issue,
which while valuable may be harder to quantify. See Rodgers, supra note 8, at 288
(acknowledging prestige of BCS conference membership).
194. See 2009-2010 Revenue Distribution Data, supra note 193 (reviewing reve-
nue distribution from BCS system as disclosed by BCS); see also BCS, Alliance, and
Coalition Games Year by Year, BCS FooTBALL, http://www.bcsfootball.org/news/
story?id=4809942 (last updated Feb. 10, 2011, 5:01 PM) (noting domination of AQ
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equally amongst the AQ and non-AQ conferences, or even equally
amongst the AQ conferences.195 For example, the Big East receives
a smaller payout from the BCS than the other AQ conferences.1 9 6
The treatment of the various independents, especially Notre Dame,
is even more difficult to rationalize. 1 9 7 Based on this pattern of dis-
crimination against non-AQ universities, plaintiffs can characterize
the BCS as a conspiracy to help the rich in college football get
richer at the expense of the "little guy."198
Despite the fact that college football is a game played by ama-
teur athletes, money is an essential part of the competition. 199 At
universities in BCS appearances). Even though after the 2009 season both Boise
State and TCU participated in BCS games, their conferences received far less reve-
nue when compared to BCS automatic qualifier conferences. See supra note 167
and accompanying text (reviewing bowl ratings). The Mountain West received
$9.8 million for TCU's appearance and the Western Athletic Conference received
only $7.8 million, while each AQ conference received at least $19.7 million and the
SEC and Big Ten each received $24.2 million. An AQ conference university can
expect at least $1 million and has a legitimate chance of seeing revenues exceed-
ing $7 million, while a non-AQ conference university could receive as little as
$180,000 for Bowl game participation before expenses. See Rodgers, supra note 8,
at 288-89 (noting revenue disparities between AQ and non-AQ universities).
195. See 2009-2010 Revenue Dishtribution Data, supra note 193 (highlighting lack
of even spread of college football proceeds); see also supra note 193 and accompa-
nying text (examining specifics of revenue inequality).
196. See 2009-2010 Revenue Distribution Data, supra note 193 (outlining gap in
proceeds received by several power conferences). The Big East receives approxi-
mately $19 million, while the SEC receives over $22 million. See id. (showing differ-
ences in BCS payouts to several difference athletic conferences).
197. See Schmit, supra note 8, at 249 (noting differential treatment of Notre
Dame); see also infra note 217 and accompanying text (reviewing disparate treat-
ment of Notre Dame compared to AQ teams, non AQ teams, and other
independents).
198. See Rodgers, supra note 8, at 290 (reviewing revenue distribution of 2004
bowl season). This is particularly apparent when reviewing the distribution of reve-
nues from the 2004 bowl season. See id. (noting uneven revenue distribution).
The twenty-first ranked University of Pittsburg Panthers were paid $14 million for
being blown out in the Fiesta Bowl, while undefeated Boise State was paid $1.35
million to play number seven ranked Louisville in the Liberty Bowl. Id. Louisville
was ranked number seven at the time, and was also paid $1.35 million. Id. The
end result is that the BCS can distribute revenue in ways not truly reflective of on
field performance. See id. (reviewing Bowl payouts not necessarily consistent with
on field performance). This was not a problem unique to the 2004 season, as in
1998 an undefeated Tulane team received $1.1 million from its bowl while 8-3
Syracuse received $12.5 million for winning the Big East automatic BCS bid. See id.
at 290-91 (highlighting disparity in amounts received for BCS bowls versus non-
BCS bowls).
199. See, e.g., Chris Isidore, College Sports' Fuzzy Math, CNN MONEY (Nov. 10,
2006, 3:26 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2006/11/10/commentary/sportsbiz/in-
dex.htm (noting scale of business aspects of college athletics). College football
revenue often supports the rest of a university's athletic department. See id. (show-
ing university competition for big budget college football programs). However, it
is also a major source of revenue for the universities as a whole. See id. (highlight-
ing amounts of money attributable to college football programs).
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present, there is what can be called an "arms race" amongst major
conference football programs as they compete to hire the best
coaches, the best assistant coaches, and to build the biggest and
most extravagant facilities.200 Successful coaches are often lured
away to more prominent programs with promises of more money or
other benefits, leaving shattered football programs in their wake. 201
Recruits are often lured by spectacular facilities and the chance of
playing on national television in prestigious bowl games such as the
national title game or the Rose Bowl. 2 0 2 One need look no further
than the various services rating college recruiting classes to see the
200. For a more detailed discussion of the college football arms race, see
supra note 154 and accompanying text (outlining college football arms race to
obtain recruits and larger football budgets). The importance of this arms race and
of victory in college football extends even beyond the athletic department. See id.
(noting correlation between large budgets and NCAA victories); see also Corns,
supra note 8, at 85-86 (describing effect of BCS revenue inequalities on nonreve-
nue sports). Because football finances many of a universities sports, BCS football
proceeds can serve to enhance the competitiveness of a university's other teams.
See id. (stating importance to large budgets in order to compete on national scale);
Penn State Sees Enrollment Growth, Minority Enrollment, Applications Reach Record Levels,
Penn State Live (Nov. 17, 2006), http://live.psu.edu/story/20889 (noting record
enrollment for 2006-2007 academic year). Following its successful 2005 football
season culminating in an Orange Bowl appearance, Penn State featured unexpect-
edly large student enrollment for the 2006-2007 university year, indicating that a
successful football program is useful for attracting students. See id. (highlighting
attractiveness to incoming students of competitive football programs); Penn State
Kicks Florida State in 3 OTs, NBC SPoRTs (Jan. 4, 2006), http://nbcsports.msnbc.
com/id/10699114/ (recounting Penn State victory in 2006 Orange Bowl).
201. See, e.g., Urban Meyer, GATOR ZONE, http://www.gatorzone.com/football/
bios.php?year=2009&staff=meyer (last visited Mar. 25, 2011) [hereinafter Meyer)
(reviewing career of Meyer including coaching tenures at Bowling Green, Utah,
and Florida). Urban Meyer is perhaps the best known example of this phenome-
non. See id. (chronicalling winding career path of Meyer). After leading the Uni-
versity of Utah to an undefeated season in 2004, he was hired as the head coach at
Florida, where he coached two championship teams. See id. (describing ascent of
Meyer from small school coach to two time national title winner). Rich Rodriguez
is another example. He moved from Tulane to West Virginia to Michigan, each
time receiving a substantial increase in compensation. See Dan Feldman, Rich Rod-
riguez: The Man Behind the Myth, MICH. DAILY (Sept. 4, 2008), http://www.michi-
gandaily.com/content/rich-rodriguez-man-behind-myth (providing career track of
Rodriquez). A third example is Notre Dame coach Brian Kelly, who moved from
Central Michigan to Cincinnati to Notre Dame. See Brian Kelly Profile, UNIv. OF
NOTRE DAME, http://www.und.com/sports/m-footbl/mtt/kelly_brian00.html (last
visited Apr. 12, 2012) (displaying Kelly's career track).
202. See 2011 Team Rankings, RwAs, http://rivals.yahoo.com/ncaa/football/
recruiting/teamrank/2011/all/all (last updated Feb. 14, 2011, 11:56 AM) [herein-
after 2011 Team Rankings] (ranking incoming recruiting classes of NCAA Division I
Football Bowl Subdivision, or FBS, programs). The advantages in recruiting which
arise out of BCS conference membership manifest themselves in the annual
recruiting rankings. See id. (indicating superiority of BCS membership based on
most prestigious recruiting classes). As of March 24, 2011, no non-AQ conference
university was ranked in the top twenty-five of the Rivals.com 2011 recruiting rank-
ings. See id. (showing superiority of AQ teams in attracting top recruits).
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effect of these trends on college recruiting, as these lists are domi-
nated by Automatic Qualifying, or AQ universities. 203
BCS games channel more money to the six AQ conferences,
which allows AQ conference teams to develop an increasingly
greater monetary edge over non-AQ teams and conferences. 204
These advantages help feed these programs more top recruits,
which in turn fosters more winning by AQ conference teams, lead-
ing to more BCS appearances and a continuation of the cycle.205
Non-BCS teams are forced to compete athletically with a lower qual-
ity of recruit, and successful coaches who are able to make the most
of this inferior talent pool are often hired away by AQ
universities. 206
The BCS opponents can also draw an analogy to Aspen Ski-
ing.2 0 7 In that case, a group of three ski resorts actively refused to
cooperate with a fourth ski resort to offer a combined lift ticket for
203. See id. (listing universities from AQ conferences in majority of ranking
slots). As of March 24, 2011, the top ten teams in the rivals.com recruiting rank-
ings were Alabama, Florida State, Texas, USC, Georgia, LSU, Auburn, Clemson,
Oregon, and Notre Dame. Id. All of these teams have won a BCS national champi-
onship except for Georgia, Clemson, Oregon, and Notre Dame; LSU and Alabama
have won two. See BCS, Alliance, and Coalition Games Year by Year, BCS FooTBALL,
http://www.bcsfootball.org/news/story?id=4809942 (last updated Feb. 10, 2011,
5:01 PM) (recording national champions of BCS era).
204. See Craig Harris, BCS: The Money. The Games. An Arizona Republic Investi-
gative Series, AZCENTRAL.COM http://www.azcentral.com/news/bcs/?content=bcs-
payouts (last visited Apr. 12, 2012) ("The majority of the money, which has come
from the four BCS bowls, TV networks and corporate sponsors, goes to universities
at six major conferences."). The danger of this uneven distribution of revenues is
the creation of a caste system within college football, beyond what would exist
absent the BCS. See McClelland, supra note 4, at 213 ("The BCS creates an imbal-
ance, negatively affecting recruiting, facilities, and overall university athletic pro-
grams for non-BCS members. The BCS greatly exacerbates and perpetuates a
caste system that cannot be broken. The disparities between BCS members and
non-BCS members extend beyond the football field, into the athletic programs of
every Division I university because of unbalanced opportunities to compete for a
national championship and the disproportionate payout of revenues from the BCS
games."); Schmit, supra note 8, at 244-45 (noting that as time passes and resource
inequality grows it becomes harder and harder for non-BCS universities to com-
pete with BCS universities).
205. See McClelland, supra note 4, at 213 (explaining how BCS creates imbal-
ance in NCAA athletics programs). For a further discussion of how the BCS per-
petuates a biased system, see supra notes 202-204 and accompanying text.
206. See 2011 Team Rankings, supra note 202 (noting that as of March 24, 2011
TCU has highest ranked recruiting class of non-AQ conference team during 2011
season, ranked number twenty-six nationally); see also Meyer, supra note 201 (noting
successful coaches such as Urban Meyer move on to more prestigious AQ pro-
grams over time).
207. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985).
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all four resorts.208 The Supreme Court held this pattern of conduct
to be impermissible exercise of monopoly power. 209 Applying this
rationale to college football, opponents of the BCS system could
claim that the BCS is refusing to cooperate with non-AQ confer-
ences to produce a product that the "customers" would like, namely
a more inclusive bowl system or a college football playoff.2 1 0
2. Pro Competitive Justifications
In the defense of the BCS, the defendants will have numerous
pro competitive justifications for the BCS. First, the BCS was cre-
ated for the explicit purpose of creating a new product, namely a
national championship game.211 Without the BCS, it would be dif-
ficult to reliably create a competition between the top two teams
within the realm of the bowl system, as evidenced by the pre-BCS
state of affairs. 212 The BCS provides an opportunity for all member
bowls to host national title games every four years; in exchange,
member schools must periodically give up their conference tie-ins
where necessary to the title game.213
The rotation of the site of the national championship game
likely was a necessary condition of the creation of the BCS, as evi-
denced by the seven-year holdout of the Rose Bowl, Big Ten, and
208. See id. at 604, 610 (holding that conduct of dominant player in Aspen
Skiing market constituted anti-trust violation). At the time of the case there were
four major ski resorts in the Aspen area. See id. at 589 (reviewing conditions of
Aspen ski resport market in early 1980s). Three of them were owned by one cor-
poration, and had in prior years cooperated with the fourth to offer an all-moun-
tain lift ticket. See id. at 589-91 (describing ownership situation of ski resorts in
Aspen area in early 1980s). Eventually, cooperation ceased, and the three moun-
tains refused to deal with the fourth, leaving it to create a pass on its own. See id. at
593-94 (recounting circumstances of deterioriation of cooperative relationship be-
tween resorts).
209. See id. at 604 (finding refusal to cooperate to provide product demanded
by customers and offered in past was anti-trust violation under certain factual
circumstances).
210. See, e.g., Hales, supra note 8 at 126 (citing purported advantage of playoff
system compared to BCS). The one constant in the college football universe is
that nobody is ever happy with the status quo. See id. (proposing two less restrictive
playoff formats).
211. See Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 441 U.S. 1 (1979), 441
U.S. 1, 21-24 (1979) [hereinafter BMI] (noting creation of new product previously
unavailable due to transaction cost burden is precompetitive). For a further dis-
cussion of the holding in BMI, see supra note 130 and accompanying text. For a
review of the development of the BCS and the process of creating a national cham-
pionship game, see supra notes 32-38 and accompanying text.
212. For a review of the problems that existed before the BCS, see supra notes
30-33 and accompanying text.
213. For a review of the development of the BCS and the process of creating a
national championship game, see supra notes 32-38 and accompanying text.
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Pac Ten.214 The details of the BCS suggest that the arrangement
between all the parties was carefully negotiated. 215 For example,
Rose Bowl receives preferential treatment in several ways, including
its own television deal. 216
Notre Dame is also treated differently from all AQ universities,
non-AQ universities, and the other independents. 217 No doubt this
is reflective of the strength of Notre Dame in the marketing of its
"product," emphasized by the fact that it has a separate television
broadcast deal for its regular season games and has often been the
subject of controversial at-large selections to BCS games. 21 8
214. See Schmit, supra note 8 at 228-29 (noting hold out of Pac Ten, Big Ten,
and Rose Bowl from BCS predecessors). The Big Ten, Pac Ten, and Rose Bowl
initially held out of the predecessors of the BCS, the Bowl Coalition and the Bowl
Alliance, until repeated denials at chances for undisputed national championships
and an opportunity to host national championship games induced them to join
the Bowl Alliance and create the BCS. See id. (reviewing evolution of BCS).
215. For a review of rule of reason analysis and the importance of the availa-
bility of less restrictive means of achieving the same pro competitive benefits, see
supra notes 116-118 and accompanying text. This would suggest that a less restric-
tive means of creating a guaranteed matchup between the top two teams is not
possible, which is highly relevant for rule of reason analysis. See id. (acknowledging
the availability of less restrictive means of achieving same pro competitive benefits
undercuts pro competitive justification for restraints with anticompetitive effects).
If there is no less restrictive means to obtain the pro-competitive benefits of the
BCS, then if the pro competitive benefits outweigh the anti-competitive effects of
the BCS than the BCS will survive an antitrust challenge. See id. (describing pro-
cess of rule of reason analysis). While it can be claimed that a matchup between
the top teams does not require uneven revenue distribution, this does ignore the
business reality that some teams are inherently more marketable than others. See
Corns, supra note 8, at 189 (noting BYU was denied bid to BCS game because they
were not as "marketable" as other teams). But see Grow, supra note 8, at 82-83
(arguing that it would be "easy" to have national championship game without une-
ven revenue distribution). For a further discussion of why a matchup between the
top teams does not require uneven revenue distribution, see supra note 194 and
accompanying text.
216. See Larry Stewart, ABC, Rose Bowl Extend Television Contract to 2014, LA
TIMEs, Aug. 5, 2004, at 3, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2004/aug/05/
sports/sp-rosebowl5 (noting separate broadcast rights within BCS package for
Rose Bowl). The Rose Bowl also has unique privileges and responsibilities regard-
ing protection of its matchups. See, e.g., BCS Chronology, supra note 42 (noting that
Rose Bowl must accept non-AQ automatic berth team if team leaves Rose Bowl for
title game).
217. See Selection Procedures, supra note 71 (noting automatic qualification re-
quirements of Notre Dame, which differ from other independents and non-AQ
teams). In order to automatically qualify for a BCS game, Notre Dame must finish
ranked number 8 or higher in the BCS standings. See id. (identifying requirements
for independent Notre Dame to receive automatic BCS berth).
218. See BCS, Alliance, and Coalition Games Year by Year, BCS FOOTBALL, http://
www.bcsfootball.org/news/story?id=4809942 (last updated Feb. 10, 2011, 5:01 PM)
(noting numerous Notre Dame BCS appearances). Notre Dame has historically
been a favorite at large participant of the BCS. See id. (listing numerous BCS ap-
pearances by Notre Dame as at-large selection). However, their performance in
these games has often fallen short of expectations. See id. (chronicling numerous
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The BCS can look to BMI for support of its position.219 The
BMI case legitimized blanket licensee agreements for music in large
part because such agreements dramatically reduced transaction
costs, which is seen as highly pro-competitive. 220 Much as blanket
licensing provides those desiring use of a portfolio of intellectual
property a low-transaction cost method to obtain the rights to that
portfolio, the BCS allows the creation of a national championship
game by minimizing the transaction costs associated with setting up
the game.221
This elimination of transaction costs occurred in the complex
negotiations that created the BCS system, and involved give and
take from many parties, largely dictated by the strength of their bar-
gaining positions.222 The resulting product, favoring the strong
on-field failures of Notre Dame in BCS bowls); see also Notre Dame Agrees to Five Year
Extension With NBC, ESPN, http://sports.espn.go.com/ncf/news/story?id=3452161
(last updatedJun. 19, 2008, 3:52 PM) (demonstrating marketability of Notre Dame
"brand" as evidenced by lucrative broadcast rights contract worth in excess of $9
million annually).
219. See Broad. Music Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., 441 U.S. 1, 21-24 (1979)
(holding that blanket fixed price license agreements were legal under anti-trust
laws). A blanket license agreement for intellectual property, in this case music, is a
contract where a user pays a flat fee to use all compositions in a given portfolio for
a flat fee. See id. at 5 (stating blanket license agreements for music "give the licen-
sees the right to perform any and all of the compositions owned by the members
or affiliates as often as the licensees desire for a stated term"). Without blanket
license agreements, those who wish to use intellectual property must negotiate
with each property holder separately, resulting in a huge increase in transaction
costs. See id. at 20 ("Indeed, as both the Court of Appeals and CBS recognize, the
costs are prohibitive for licenses with individual radio stations, nightclubs, and res-
taurants . . . and it was in that milieu that the blanket license arose.").
220. See id. ("A middleman with a blanket license was an obvious necessity if
the thousands of individual negotiations, a virtual impossibility, were to be
avoided. Also, individual fees for the use of individual compositions would presup-
pose an intricate schedule of fees and uses, as well as a difficult and expensive
reporting problem for the user and policing task for the copyright owner.").
221. For a discussion of potential sources of transaction costs avoided
through BCS, see supra notes 212-218 and accompanying text.
222. See Schmit, supra note 8 at 223 (using Rose Bowl example to show negoti-
ations that took place in formation of BCS). The Rose Bowl's stronger position in
comparison to the other BCS Bowls from its pre-existing ties to the powerful Pac
Ten and Big Ten conferences likely gave it the leverage it required to secure pref-
erential treatment in a number of ways. See id. at 223 n.15 (referring to prestigious
Rose Bowl as "Granddaddy of Them All"). Indeed, the Rose Bowl only joined the
BCS after both Big Ten and Pac Ten teams were denied chances to compete in
national championships due to the contractual ties to the Rose Bowl. See id. at 229
(describing Big Ten and Pac Ten decision to join BCS). The BCS conferences, as
the homes of the traditional powers of college football, invariably had greater mar-
ket power than the non-BCS conferences. See id at 243-44 (remarking upon
"trickle down effect" of system, which prefers BCS teams to non-BCS teams). No-
tre Dame has a great deal of market power even by itself. See id. at 249 (analyzing
deferential treatment given to Notre Dame). For a review of the history of the
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over the weak, is not surprising. The same pattern is also reflected
in modem blanket license agreements. 223
The BCS can also note that by packaging the TV rights to four
of five BCS bowl games together, they can collectively negotiate a
more lucrative TV package than the four bowls could negotiate sep-
arately. 2 2 4 From the point of view of a television network, consoli-
dation of television rights for multiple bowls games in a participant-
driven market creates synergies which increase the value of the
whole package above the aggregate value of each individual bowl's
broadcast rights. 225
creation of the BCS including the "holdouts" of the Big Ten, Pac Ten, and Rose
Bowl, see supra notes 23-49 and accompanying text.
223. See, e.g., BMI, 441 U.S. at 5 (condoning blanket license agreements for
intellectual property on basis of pro-competitive effects). A well-known consumer-
facing side of a modern blanket license agreement is the Apple iTunes store,
which charges different prices for downloading items of greater or lesser popular-
ity. See Changes Coming to iTunes Store, APPLE (Jan. 6, 2009), http://www.apple.
com/pr/library/2009/01/06itunes.html (describing tiered pricing approach as
part of new agreement with major record labels). The iTunes store is so effective
at reducing transaction costs that it successfully competes with free illegal
downloading. SeeJim Dalrymple, Report: iTunes More Popular Than Illegal Download-
ing, MAc WoRLD (Feb. 14, 2008, 4:33 PM), http://www.macworld.com/article/
132116/2008/02/filesharing.html (remarking that iTunes effectively competes
with free illegal downloads).
224. See Hampp, supra note 182 (stating that packaging TV rights within mul-
tiple platforms for games makes "multiplatform ad buying all the more appealing
to advertisers" and leading to even more profits). Since the BCS has been around
through several re-negotiations of television rights, it is difficult, if not impossible,
to estimate what the bowls could individually negotiate. See id. ("Forecasting where
ad dollars and sports marketing are going to be in three-plus years is pretty tough
... ."). However, considering the current extremely lucrative multi-bowl deal with
ESPN, it remains unlikely that the individual bowls, with a weaker product, could
aggregate a comparable deal. See id. (describing ESPN's $500 million bid for ex-
clusive rights to broadcast BCS games beginning in 2011). There are, of course,
issues of monopolization, but outside of these concerns, if the end goal is maximiz-
ing revenue for NCAA athletic programs, the BCS is very pro-competitive because
it produces a product for which television networks will pay a premium price. For
a further discussion of television antitrust issues, see infra notes 267-277 and ac-
companying text. The initial television rights for the four BCS games were sold to
ABC sports for an estimated $780 million over eight years, while more recently
ESPN has agreed to pay $125 million per year to broadcast BCS games for a period
of four years. See Grow, supra note 8, at 89-90 (noting increase in price paid for
BCS broadcast rights following creation of BCS).
225. See supra note 167 and accompanying tables (illustrating greater ratings
stability of BCS games compared with lower-level bowls). The primary synergy is
more stability in television ratings. See id. (showing importance of television ratings
for BCS bowl games). Bowl game ratings are matchup driven, so owning a portfo-
lio which delivers most if not all of the most compelling matchups is beneficial for
television networks. See supra note 179 (noting how compelling non-BCS match-
ups between popular teams can outdraw BCS games). These advantages of stabil-
ity become even more pronounced when aggregated. The average expected
rating of a BCS game based on data from 2006 to 2010 is 10.25, varying between
11.2 and 9.5 with a variance of 0.56 and a standard deviation of .75. See supra note
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The BCS package in the aggregate features lower ratings vola-
tility than each individual bowl game, which is important in a mar-
ket driven by bowl participants. 226 By packaging together most if
not all of the most compelling games of the year, the BCS effec-
tively captures a diversification premium which might otherwise be
lost.2 2 7 Without the BCS, it would be more difficult for a network
to capture these efficiencies because there would be less certainty
on the value of each bowl. 2 2 8 If each bowl had to sell its broadcast
rights separately, the networks would face greater uncertainty in de-
termining the proper price for bowl game television rights and
might be inclined to be more conservative when bidding for these
rights, ultimately resulting in less revenue for nonprofit NCAA
members.229
The BCS agreement reduces uncertainty for television execu-
tives, who ultimately care mostly about the television ratings, be-
cause these drive advertising prices.230 From the point of view of
167 (providing source data for calculations showing diversified portfolio of BCS
games produces lower ratings volatility in the aggregate than individual BCS
games). Judging by the value the market places on BCS rights and the lack of
antitrust lawsuits from broadcasters, these efficiencies, monopoly aspects aside, are
of great value to television networks. See infra note 284 (discussing network valua-
tion of BCS bowl game broadcast rights).
226. See supra note 225 and accompanying text (noting greater stability in
broadcast ratings for tied BCS package).
227. See infra note 278 (explaining advantage network can obtain by acquir-
ing near monopoly for bowl game broadcast rights). A mutual fund is a helpful
analogy to what the BCS does for broadcast networks, in that it captures the bene-
fits of diversification. See Invest Wisely: An Introduction to Mutual Funds, SEC. & Ex-
CHANGE COMM'N, http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/inwsmf.htm (last modified
July 2, 2008) (identifying mutual fund as risk reducing amalgamation of
securities).
228. For a review of the history of the creation of the BCS, see supra notes 23-
49 and accompanying text. If the BCS bowls could not host the national champi-
onship game every four years, they might refuse to release their conference tie-ins
to create the championship game, as the Rose Bowl did for several years. See id.
(recounting difficulties in achieving agreement between major football confer-
ences and bowl games to create national title game).
229. See supra note 172 (reviewing bowl television ratings). When looking at
the television ratings of the bowl games, the general pattern is that television rat-
ings are highest for the most compelling matchups between teams with large active
fan bases, such as LSU, Michigan, Penn State, Alabama, Florida, Ohio State, and
Notre Dame. See id. (displaying tendancy of these teams to draw strong ratings).
In addition, there is considerable volatility in bowl game ratings from year to year,
which can make it hard to predict the value of the bowl broadcast rights to net-
works. See id. (noting considerable volatility from year to year in bowl ratings).
230. SeeJim Edwards, Rise in Super Bowl Ad Prices Threatens Raw Deal for Advertis-
ers, CBS NEWS (Feb. 7, 2010, 10:27 AM), http://www.bnet.com/blog/advertising-
business/rise-in-super-bowl-ad-prices-threatens-raw-deal-for-advertisers/ 4 2 22 (not-
ing high expense and high exposure inherent in Super Bowl ads). The Super
Bowl is the most watched television event in the United States, and accordingly
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these consumers, higher average ratings and more consistent rat-
ings are important attributes. 231 The process for bidding for BCS
broadcast rights is also a competitive one. Ultimately, ESPN se-
cured the right to broadcast the BCS games in the latest series of
contracts because other bidders, such as Fox, felt their money was
better invested elsewhere. 232 The latest BCS television broadcast
deal merely represents what the market feels the fair price of this
property is worth.233
Another strong argument in favor of the BCS is that the BCS
itself was founded on the principles of competition, both athletic
and otherwise. Teams must ultimately play their way into BCS bowl
games by meeting certain criteria for wins and team ranking.234
There is a path to an automatic berth or a championship berth for
non-AQ participants if they can impress poll voters, ensuring that a
quality product is delivered to the BCS bowl games.235
commands some of the highest advertising rates of any broadcast event. See id.
(tracing rise in cost of thirty second long commercial along with rise in Super Bowl
ratings).
231. For discussion of a potential illegal monopolization claim, see infra notes
266-277 and accompanying text. The fact that networks will pay a premium price
for the bundled product this does not mean that this is the competitive price or
that there is not an illicit monopoly at play. See id. (analyzing BCS as potential
illegal monopoly). See also supra note 225 (acknowledging BCS as tied product
produces ratings stability which may demand premium price).
232. See ESPN Officially Signs Deal for BCS Games Beginning in 2011, SPORTS BusI-
NESS DAILY (Nov. 18, 2008), http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Daily/Issues/
2008/11/Issue-46/Sports-Media/ESPN-Officially-Signs-Deal-For-BCS-Games-Be-
ginning-In-2011.aspx (reviewing most recent round of BCS broadcast rights sale
negotiations).
233. See id. (noting competitive bidding process). No network is being forced
to purchase the BCS broadcast rights, but multiple networks are engaged in com-
petitive bidding. See id. (noting networks compete). While ESPN may currently
dominate the cable sports market, other networks may attempt to challenge this
position in the future by bidding on the BCS or other premier sports packages.
See, e.g., Clair Atkinson, NBC Sports Networks' Ratings Take Biggest Drop in Eight Years
After Overhau4 N.Y. PosT (Mar. 31, 2012 2:15 AM), http://www.nypost.com/p/
news/business/what-the-puck-wn2b9Gi99p6hpCmcEp3CdP (noting creation of
potential future rival to ESPN).
234. For a discussion of the BCS selection process, see supra notes 52-80 and
accompanying text. The objective nature of this process, once the inputs are de-
termined, is the type of nondiscriminatory restraint looked upon with favor in
NCAA v. Board of Regents. See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85,
118 (1984) (holding "The interest in maintaining a competitive balance that is
asserted by the NCAA as a justification for regulating all television of intercollegi-
ate football is not related to any neutral standard or to any readily identifiable
group of competitors.").
235. In the context of at-large bids, there is no difference between the treat-
ment of AQ and non-AQ teams, as discussed supra notes 73-75 and in accompany-
ing text.
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While this path is undeniably difficult, the BCS bowl games are
well within their rights to demand a certain level of quality for their
bowl participants. 236 As far as the bowl games themselves, member-
ship in the BCS was the end result of decades of competition for
the most lucrative conference tie-ins, with the most successful bowl
games forming the BCS.23 7
Additionally, the BCS has not in fact foreclosed competition
from other non-AQ universities or conferences.238 Boise State,
Utah, and TCU have all played in two BCS games each, while the
University of Hawaii ("Hawaii") appeared in one.23 9 While some
may claim that a non-AQ team may never have a chance at the na-
tional title game, non-AQ teams such as Boise State have at times
come close. 240 Because of the present structure of the BCS, in
which the human voters in the Harris Poll and the Coaches Poll
control two thirds of the selection criteria, if enough people truly
believe a non-AQ team deserves to play for the title then that team
should have the opportunity. 241
Calling appearances by non-AQ universities compliant compe-
tition is a disservice to those universities on two levels. First, the BCS
criteria in terms of selecting automatic berths is objective, in that
236. See, e.g., Int'l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 398 (1947) (noting
that vertical restraints intended to set "reasonable standards" which all suppliers
may meet are reasonable so long as they are not disguised restraints on free com-
petition). Anti-trust law does not suggest that a manufacturer is not free to set
standards for its own "inputs." See id. (reserving right of manufacturers to set qual-
ity standards for raw materials).
237. For a discussion of the conference tie-ins at the time of the creation of
the Bowl Coalition, see supra note 33. The bowl games which initially partnered
with the Bowl Coalition had tie-ins with the dominant conferences of the time. See
id. (noting most premier conferences joined Bowl Coalition). See also Grow, supra
note 8, at 83-4 (noting availability of argument that BCS revenue distributions are
not anti-competitive but in fact are reflective of current market power and value).
238. See Warmbrod, supra note 8, at 373 (noting options available to non-BCS
universities within existing system and acknowledging general vitality of competi-
tion within current system). There is nothing in the BCS which prevents non-BCS
teams from creating their own bowl games or their own alternative system for de-
termining a championship. See id. (indicating absence of noncompete provisions).
239. See supra note 194 (reviewing BCS game participants).
240. See Erick Smith, Boise State Must Pick Up Pieces After Loss to Nevada, USA
TODAY (Nov. 27, 2010, 11:57 AM), http://content.usatoday.com/communities/
campusrivalry/post/2010/11 /boise-state-must-pick-up-pieces-after-loss-to-nevada/
1 (noting that because of loss Boise State was unlikely to play for national champi-
onship). If Boise State had defeated Nevada in 2010, there was a very real possibil-
ity that the voters would have granted Boise State a chance to play for the national
title. See id. (noting that Boise State likely lost chance to play for title due to missed
field goal).
241. For a review of the 2003 BCS controversy and the changes that arose out
of it, see supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text.
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the non-AQ teams which qualified for automatic berths did so by
played within the system. 242 Second, it assumes that the bowls
would never select a non-AQ team as an at-large bid. But after the
2009 season, Boise State received an at-large bid to play in the Fi-
esta Bowl. 2 4 3 The Fiesta Bowl could have chosen traditional BCS
conference powers Penn State or Virginia Tech, but instead chose
Boise State.244 So on this occasion, Boise State out-competed Penn
State and Virginia Tech, from a business perspective at least.2 4 5
The fact that the BCS bowls do periodically select non-AQ uni-
versities also defeats the Aspen Skiing analogy.2 46 The BCS is in fact
dealing with entities outside the AQ conferences.247 In Aspen Ski-
ing, the product at issue had been offered in the past and was popu-
lar with customers. 248 Here, there is no history to suggest that
customers were previously offered a product that they would now
like to see offered again. 2 4 9
With regards to the dangers of uneven revenue distribution un-
fairly upsetting the competitive balance of college football, the Su-
242. See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 118 (1984)
(noting importance of neutral generally applicable standards when analyzing
NCAA restrictions under anti-trust laws). See also supra note 194 (reviewing BCS
game participants).
243. See infra note 244 (describing circumstances of Boise State's selection).
244. See BCS Selections History, BCS FOOTBALL (Dec. 6, 2011, 5:35 PM), http://
www.bcsfootball.org/news/story?id=5528971 (stating 2009 at-large selection of
Boise State). It should be noted that there is nothing in the BCS selection proce-
dures that control exactly how decisions regarding at-large bids are made, and it is
entirely possible that the BCS pressured the Fiesta Bowl to select Boise State to
prevent a BCS conference team from losing or to create favorable evidence for an
anti-trust lawsuit defense. See Jeremy Mauss, First Impression of Bowl Matchups . . .
Really BCS TCU v. Boise State, MOUNTAIN W. CONNECTION (Dec. 6, 2009, 8:39 PM),
http://www.mwcconnection.com/2009/12/6/1188723/first-impressions-of-bowl-
matchups (calling 2009 Fiesta Bowl matchup "slap in the face" to both universities
and questioning motivation for at-large selection of Boise State).
245. See supra note 167 (summarizing broadcast ratings for BCS bowl games in
2009). This matchup managed to create enough interest to allow the Fiesta Bowl
to attract a higher television rating than the Orange Bowl in 2009. See id. (indicat-
ing potential appeal of compelling non-AQ matchups in BCS games).
246. For a review of the Aspen Skiing analogy to the BCS, see supra notes 208-
209 and accompanying text.
247. See supra note 194 (acknowledging participation by non-AQ universities).
248. See Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 595
(1985) (noting prior availability of collaborative product and detrimental effect on
plaintiffs business following elimination of collaborative product).
249. See id. (recognizing importance of previously offering of collaborative
product in refusal to deal analysis under certain factual conditions). The true
analogy to Aspen Skiing would be if the Bowl Alliance sued the Rose Bowl, Big Ten,
and Pac Ten, for refusing to cooperate to offer a product which customers presum-
ably preferred over an alternative scenario during the period prior to the creation
of the BCS. See id. (reviewing competitive environment at issue in Aspen Skiing).
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preme Court previously rejected such an argument in NCAA v.
Board of Regents. 25 o The court explicitly noted that the restrictions
challenged in that case were not related to expenditures on coach-
ing salaries or facilities, where any such advantage would likely
arise.251 This pronouncement leaves open the door for restrictions
such as a salary cap for coaching staffs or limitations on total foot-
ball expenditures, but that issue is unrelated to the BCS. 25 2
The fact is that the universities in the AQ conferences and the
BCS game participants receive a greater share of the revenue and
correspondingly greater resources for the college football arms race
can be characterized as the result of these universities being more
competitive than the competition, as evidenced by the sharing of
power in the BCS. 2 5 3 AQ teams gained access to these resources by
out competing other teams.254 The rich in college football do get
richer, but they earned that position through competition, both
250. See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 109 (1984)
(dismissing legal argument put forth by petitioner). It should be noted that many
of the concerns brought out in that case have been vindicated by subsequent devel-
opments, and that a court may re-evaluate this position in light of new evidence.
See supra note 154 (acknowledging ongoing collegiate athletics arms race). For a
discussion of how NCAA v. Board of Regents relates to this case, see supra notes 141-
159 and accompanying text.
251. For a discussion on television rights that did not affect areas of non-
economic competition, see supra note 145 and accompanying text (discussing im-
portance of television rights to national sports broadcasts).
252. See Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1024 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding that
college coaching salary restrictions were an unreasonable restraint of trade). See
also Corns, supra note 8, at 180 (reviewing application of NCAA v. Board of Regents
in the Law case and NCAA's failure to show that pro-competitive benefits of restric-
tion on coaching salaries outweighed anticompetitive effects).
253. See Schmit, supra note 8, at 220 (admitting that matchups between non-
BCS universities and between BCS and non-BCS universities may provide lower
level of public interest). Even critics of the BCS acknowledge that public interest
and the associated economic effects of those interests may be best served by dis-
criminating against non-BCS teams, because the public may be more interested in
traditional football powers than in the exploits of lower profile universities. See id.
at 247 (identifying types of games that draw biggest fan base). For a discussion of
the importance of bargaining power in creation of BCS, see supra note 222 and
accompanying text.
254. See Rodgers, supra note 8, at 288 (noting costly requirements of participa-
tion in Division IA football in 2008). The NCAA does have a minimum standard
to establish a FBS football program. See id. (reviewing NCAA minimum require-
ments in 2008). If a university cannot meet this standard, the university could
conceivably opt to play in a lower division, or to not play football at all. NCAA
universities are not required to play FBS football. See id. (acknowledging minimum
requirements for participation). A great majority of universities athletic depart-
ments operate at a deficit as a result of sustaining a program. See Rodgers, supra
note 8, at 288 (expressing concern over fact that only football and men's basket-
ball generate large amounts of revenue).
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athletic and otherwise.255 The goal of American anti-trust law is to
protect competition, not competitors.2 5 6 The sad reality for sup-
porters of non-AQ conferences and universities is that they often
are the "small dealers and worthy men," which anti-trust law is not
intended to defend. 2 5 7
Finally, there is the one argument that ultimately hangs over
any discussion of the BCS and championships in college football,
both from a legal perspective and the perspective of a college foot-
ball fan. Ultimately, participation in the national championship
game is decided on the field. 2 5 8 If a team wants a chance at the
national title, they need to have a successful undefeated or at the
most one loss season against top quality competition.2 59 Achieving
this is difficult, but history has shown this to be a requirement for a
chance at the national title. It takes years to build up reputations of
football excellence, and anti-trust lawsuits are not truly effective
mechanisms for penetrating the glass ceiling of perceptions in the
eyes of poll voters. 260
3. Balancing the Issues
Considering all these factors, from a business perspective, it is
arguably true that the pro competitive justifications for the BCS
255. For a discussion of AQ teams that are financially successful, see infra note
307. For a discussion of the domination of AQ universities in major bowls, see
infra note 295.
256. For a discussion of goals of U.S. antitrust law, see infra note 320.
257. See Nixon, supra note 5, at 375 (noting that U.S. antitrust laws protect
competition rather than competitors); see also United States v. Trans-Mo. Freight
Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 323 (1897) (using phrase "small dealers and worthy men" to
identify those left unprotected by law).
258. For a discussion of the winning records of BCS title game participants,
see supra note 194 and accompanying text. The polls and the computer rankings
are re-evaluated each week as a result of each week's games. See id. (noting weekly
adjustments of BCS rankings). If a team keeps winning and defeats quality oppo-
nents, an appearance in the national championship game is likely. See id. (listing
numerous undefeated teams which played in title game).
259. See Rodgers, supra note 8, at 291 (explaining that teams must be ex-
tremely successful to play in championship game).
260. The rise of Penn State to college football prominence is an example of a
university building its reputation on the field. For a discussion of Penn State being
denied a chance to play for a championship as an up and coming independent in
1969, see supra note 31. Later, Penn State joined the Big Ten and has since played
in two BCS bowl games. See supra note 194 (reviewing BCS game participants).
Virginia Tech is another team that went from an average program to a national
powerhouse, thanks in part to hiring and retaining coach Frank Beamer. See Frank
Beamer: Head Football Coach, HOKIE SPORTS http://www.hokiesports.com/staff/
beamer.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2012) (noting role of head coach in building
successful AQ football program).
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outweigh the anti-competitive effects of the BCS system.261 The
BCS allows for a competition between the top two teams every year,
as measured by regular season performance, for a chance to win a
national title.2 62 The BCS also creates and markets a product which
television networks will pay a premium price for.26 3 The BCS sys-
tem allows members from non-AQ conferences to participate in
BCS bowl games, including the national championship, if they can
meet the objective criteria of the BCS system.264 While the compe-
tition to get to the summit of college football is intense, competi-
tion is what the anti-trust laws are designed to protect.2 65
C. BCS as Monopolization
While market definition is always an important element in anti-
trust analysis, it is particularly important in monopolization cases.
In general, if a monopolist controls 75% or more of the relevant
market, it is established that they have a monopoly.2 66 The BCS
almost certainly satisfies the first requirement of section 2 of the
Sherman Act.2 67 However, monopoly itself is not a crime, only the
anti-competitive use of monopoly power.268
261. For a discussion of BCS antitrust vulnerability, see supra note 8 and ac-
companying text. This is of course a decision to be made by the courts. This
author is of the opinion that an anti-trust claim on the theory of a group boycott
would fail, but other commentators do not universally share this view. See id. (high-
lighting several points of view regarding viability of group boycott).
262. See National Championship Moments: 1969 Football, supra note 30 (provid-
ing one example of pre-BCS controversy). Dispute over who are the two best
teams in the rankings should be set aside, this problem predates the BCS. See id.
(exemplifying typical ranking controversy from pre-BCS area).
263. See ESPN Officially Signs Deal for BCS Games Beginning in 2011, supra note
232 (describing broadcast rights negotiation process with ESPN outbidding Fox).
264. For a review of the BCS selection procedures, see supra notes 61-80 and
accompanying text.
265. See Thomas 0. Barnett, Assistant Attorney General, Anti-Trust Division,
U.S. Department of Justice, Presentation to the Lisbon Conference on Competi-
tion Law and Economics: Competition Law and Policy Modernization: Lessons from the
U.S. Common Law Experience, Nov. 16, 2007, http://wwwjustice.gov/atr/public/
speeches/227755.htm (noting that U.S. anti-trust law focuses on protection of
completion rather than individual competitors).
266. See Sherman Act, supra note 111 (noting that possession of high degree
of market power in excess of 75% constitutes monopoly power).
267. For a review of section 2 of the Sherman Act, see supra notes 111-121 and
accompanying text. Even if the BCS has monopoly power, if the operation of the
monopoly provides objectively non-discriminatory access it would not be subject to
anti-trust liability section 2 of the Sherman Act. See Rodgers, supra note 8, at 299-
300 (noting that monopoly power by itself is not enough to establish antitrust
violation).
268. See generally United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir.
1945) (stating that possession of monopoly power alone is not an offense under
the Sherman Act).
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Measured in terms of the television ratings, the BCS bowl
games dominate the listings of the most successful bowl games.269
While sometimes non-BCS games will attract higher ratings than a
BCS game, this largely depends on the game's participants. 270 In
college football, team selections are a driving factor in ensuring
high television ratings. 271 The BCS bowls have market power by
virtue of their conference ties and their prestige.272 The bowls use
their market power and the associated monopoly profits to attract
the best "supply" for their bowl games. 273 This, however, does not
mean the other bowl games can never compete; moreover it does
not mean that the BCS has used this market power in an exclusion-
ary fashion.274
Unless the plaintiff can prove that the BCS engaged in coer-
cion during negotiations or some other exclusionary tactics where
it used its market power as a weapon against its competitors, they
will not likely suffer liability under section 2 of the Sherman act.2 75
Section two criminalizes monopolization, not monopoly.2 76 The
BCS has arguably created a superior product consumers will pay a
premium price for, and should therefore be allowed to enjoy the
resulting monopoly profits so long as the monopoly is not retained
through anti-competitive means.277
D. BCS as Illegal Tying
Generally, the rule governing illegal tying arrangements pro-
hibits forcing buyers to accept to take a tied product they neither
269. For a discussion reviewing BCS game participants, see supra note 194.
270. For a discussion of television ratings for bowl games, see supra notes 224-
233 and accompanying text.
271. For a discussion of television ratings for bowl games, see supra note 229.
272. See Rodgers, supra note 193 (acknowledging role of prestige in generat-
ing market power of BCS bowls). The market power is no doubt connected on at
least some level to the prestige of these bowls. See id. (describing how more pres-
tigious bowls such as the Rose Bowl have greater market power).
273. See id. (noting stronger bowls attract stronger teams and conferences).
274. See supra note 69 (identifying provision for automatic qualification of
non-AQ champion). To the contrary, the current incarnation of the BCS explicitly
provides a path for non-AQ teams to participate in the BCS. See id. (describing
automatic path to BCS games for non-AQ teams).
275. See Rodgers, supra note 8, at 299 (noting BCS history may constitute
prior exclusionary conduct creating illegally obtained monopoly). While there is
no evidence of ongoing Sherman Act section 2 violations, prior "bad acts" may
create the possibility for a monopolization case. See id. (noting potential liability
for past conduct).
276. See id. (describing general approach of courts to monopolization claims).
277. See supra note 232 (noting premium price paid by ESPN for BCS broad-
cast rights).
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need nor want as a condition of purchasing a product they do
want.278 They also cannot be forced via contract to purchase a tied
product they would rather purchase separately and elsewhere. 279
In the context of the BCS, the operative question is whether it is
legal under the anti-trust laws for the BCS to tie together four BCS
bowl games for the purposes of broadcast rights negotiations.28 0
Furthermore, there are substantial differences in the TV rat-
ings, even amongst BCS bowl games.281 The Rose Bowl and the
national championship game generally attract the highest rat-
ings.2 8 2 This should conceivably lead to broadcasters paying a pre-
mium price for the right to broadcast these two particular games
when compared to other BCS games.28 3 Perhaps as a reflection of
this reality, the Rose Bowl has a separate television deal. 2 8 4
278. See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 12 (1984)
("[T]he essential characteristic of an invalid tying arrangement lies in the seller's
exploitation of its control over the tying product to force the buyer into the
purchase of a tied product that the buyer either did not want at all, or might have
preferred to purchase elsewhere on different terms . . . . When such 'forcing' is
present, competition on the merits in the market for the tied item is restrained
and the Sherman Act is violated."). In general, there are four elements for an
illegal tying claim: two or more separate products grouped together, the seller
conditioning the sale of one product on the sale of the other, the seller having
enough economic power to force the buyer to purchase both products, and the
seller actually coerces the buyer to purchase both products. See Grow, supra note 8,
at 71-72 (reviewing four elements of illegal tying claim). The plaintiff must show
that they were forced to buy a product that she does not want. Id.
279. See, e.g., Int'l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947) (holding
seller with legal monopoly cannot use this power to sell product in which it lacks
such power). In this case, the specific issue was the requirement of the defendant
that those who leased its salt processing machines purchase salt from the company
as well, regardless of whether or not they wanted to. See id. at 395-96 ("Patents
confer no right to restrain use of, or trade in, unpatented salt.").
280. See id. (comparing International Salt to current issue).
281. For a discussion of television ratings for bowl games, see supra note 229
and accompanying text (outlining importance of television ratings to BCS bowl
games).
282. See id. (displaying tendency of Rose Bowl and title game to attract highest
television viewership).
283. See id. (noting some BCS bowl games are inheriently more valuable by
consistently attracting greater viewership than others).
284. See Bob Wolfley, Rose Bowl Telecast on ESPN and Only ESPN, J. SENTINEL
(Dec. 15, 2010), http://wwwjsonline.com/blogs/sports/111956529.html (noting
existence of separate television broadcast contracts for Rose Bowl prior to 2011
game). ESPN has steadily been monopolizing the market for bowl game broadcast
rights, although this is largely the result of the higher value this network places on
bowl game broadcasting. See id. (noting that by controlling more bowl game
broadcast rights ESPN parent Disney can extract higher fees from cable providers
by strengthening brand). ESPN inherited the Rose Bowl contract from its sister
network, ABC, which owned the rights through 2014. See Rudy Martzke, ABC Bun-
dles Up Rose Bowl Through 2014, USA TODAY (Aug. 4, 2004, 4:42 PM), http://www.
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Notwithstanding the above, this argument ignores the strong
pro competitive rationales behind the BCS.2 85 First of all, the BCS
arrangement creates the national title game, something that did
not exist prior to the BCS. 286 Nevertheless, it is doubtful every bowl
game would jointly agree to release conference automatic bids, cre-
ating title games without sharing of broadcast rights and
revenue.28 7
Second, by packaging the BCS bowl games together there is
less uncertainty in their value for a potential bidder.288 The process
of tying the games together increases the game's value by decreas-
ing participant-related ratings volatility.2 89 Third, the BCS itself was
the result of complex negotiations, and the tying aspects of the BCS
may have been a key requirement to secure the agreement to create
the product of a national championship game.290 Without the ty-
ing arrangement, products such as a national title game may not be
available at all.2 9' Considering the strength of the pro-competitive
usatoday.com/sports/college/football/bowls/2004-08-04-abc-rosex.htm (noting
ABC rights ownership).
285. For a review of the pro competitive benefits of the BCS, see supra notes
212-260 and accompanying text.
286. See supra note 32 (noting relative rarity of matchup between top two
teams prior to BCS era).
287. For a review of the history of the creation of the BCS, see supra notes 23-
49 and accompanying text. The process of creating the BCS was long and arduous,
and the result of almost a decade of negotiation. See id. (describing long road to
creation of national title game involving all major college football conferences).
288. For a discussion of television ratings for bowl games, see supra note 176
(reviewing ratings volatility). The BCS essentially performs the same function as a
diversified stock portfolio, where by increasing the number of stocks held, one can
decrease risk. See supra note 227 (reviewing benefits of diversification). From the
point of view of a television network, owning the broadcast rights to more major
bowl games reduces the volatility of the whole portfolio, in that if one game un-
derperforms it might be counterbalanced by another game outperforming expec-
tations. See id. (comparing ratings volitlity to stock volitility).
289. For a discussion of the relationship between bowl participants, bowl rat-
ings, and the competitive relationships of various bowls as measured by television
ratings, see supra notes 224-233 and accompanying text.
290. See Corns, supra note 8, at 198 (exemplifying that one commentator has
remarked that the same benefits of the BCS, if defined as a matchup between the
top two teams, can be achieved by merely allowing the top two ranked teams to
meet in the national championship game and letting conference tie-ins and the
free market determine the rest of the bowl matchups). However, this overlooks
the difficulty of getting conferences and Bowl games to relinquish their contrac-
tual rights, as evidenced by the development of the BCS where it took years to
secure the agreement of the Big Ten, Pac Ten, and Rose Bowl, as discussed supra
notes 32-39 and accompanying text.
291. For a review of the long and arduous history of creating a national cham-
pionship game, see supra notes 23-49 and accompanying text. History suggests that
without something like the BCS it would be difficult, if not impossible, to reliably
stage a national championship game on an annual basis between the top two teams
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benefits of the BCS and the potential beneficial aspects of the tying
arrangement for television networks, the BCS is unlikely to be held
to be an illegal tying arrangement.292
E. BCS as Output Restriction
One interesting area of potential anti-trust vulnerability in the
BCS is the conference appearance limitations.293 Under current
rules, no conference may have more than two teams in the BCS.2 9 4
This provision was likely instituted as a part of the negotiations
which created the BCS, to ensure that no single conference could
completely dominate the BCS system.295
But from a strictly legal perspective, this provision might be
suspect under the anti-trust laws as an impermissible restriction on
output.2 9 6 Theoretically, the appearance restriction prevents a con-
ference that produces a superior "product" from exploiting that su-
periority in the name of propping up a less competitive cartel
member.297 Such a restriction is unlikely to survive anti-trust
in the nation due to the large number of conflicting interests. See id. (noting years
of difficulty in creating matchup between top two teams in era before BCS).
292. For a review of the anticompetitive effects of the BCS as balanced against
the pro competitive justification of the BCS, see supra notes 192-291 and accompa-
nying text.
293. See supra note 75 (noting that no conference may have more than two
teams playing in BCS games).
294. Id.
295. For a review of the history of the creation of the BCS, see supra notes 23-
49 and accompanying text. See supra notes 214-223 and accompanying text for
explanation of argument that BCS is a carefully negotiated agreement which
makes the BCS and its pro competitive effects possible. It is not publically known
exactly that was discussed during the negotiations which created the BCS, but the
appearance restriction may have been necessary to ensure agreement amongst the
conferences. See id. (describing long road to creation of title game which is sugges-
tive of difficulty of reaching agreement).
296. Output restrictions have long been frowned upon under the anti-trust
laws. See, e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940) (inva-
liding plan by competitors to collectively remove excess production from the mar-
ket for refined gasoline); Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344
(1933) (invalidating use of group selling agent as method to limit output).
297. The behavior of OPEC over the years is a good example of how cartel
members can interact and sometimes feud. See Albert L. Danielson, Organization of
Petroleum Exporting Countries, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRYTANNICA, http://www.britannica.
com/EBchecked/topic/454413/OPEC/233528/History (last visited Apr. 13,
2012) (reviewing structure, purpose, history, and operation of oil exporting car-
tel). In the context of college football, it may not be defensible that BCS partici-
pants are paid the same amount regardless of the quality of the team or the
marketability of the team. See Corns, supra note 8, at 89 (noting that quality and
marketability of BCS participants is not tied to financial rewards of BCS
participation).
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scrutiny without a strong pro-competitive justification.2 9 8
While the anti-competitive effects are clear, the pro competi-
tive justifications are less so. The strongest argument for the BCS is
the appearance restriction was likely a part of the deal which cre-
ated the BCS in the first place, and may have been necessary to
secure the agreement which facilitated a national title game.29 9
The BCS can also make competitive balance arguments, although
these arguments are directly analogous to what was rejected in
NCAA v Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma.300 A court
would have to decide, although it appears this might be a closer
case than some other areas of attack on the BCS.3 01
Many observers of college football would undoubtedly wonder
who would ever challenge these restrictions. It would likely be an
AQ university or an AQ conference, but why would one of the great
powers of college football bite the hand that feeds it millions of
dollars every season? It seems inconceivable, but it happened
before and it could happen again. 302
In the early 1980s, the Universities of Georgia and Oklahoma
directly challenged the NCAA in an effort to generate more reve-
nue for their football programs, despite the threat of sanctions in
all sports, not just football.3 03 They gambled, and they won.3 04 The
climate of college football over the past few years is so intensely
298. See supra note 296 (noting courts have long disfavored output
restrictions).
299. For a review of the history of the creation of the BCS, see supra notes 23-
49 and accompanying text.
300. For a review of these aspects of NCAA v. Board of Regents see supra notes
152-155 and accompanying text. There is arguably no difference between the tele-
vision appearance restrictions rejected in NCAA v. Board of Regents and the appear-
ance restrictions in the BCS, and they would not likely survive anti-trust scrutiny-
assuming the court follows the same line of reasoning-because of the similarity of
the likely justifications to those rejected in NCAA v. Board of Regents. See id. (review-
ing Supreme Court's rejection of proposed justifications for NCAA television rights
plan).
301. For a review of the pro-competitive aspects and defenses of the BCS, see
supra notes 211-260 and accompanying text. There are so many strong pro com-
petitive justifications to the rest of the BCS that if ajudge decided to invalidate the
appearance restrictions of the BCS the BCS members may decide not to radically
change a system which is generating a great deal of revenue. See id. (listing many
positive pro competitive aspects of BCS which could survive on their merits if ap-
pearance limitation is struck down by court).
302. While it at first appears to be unlikely that a BCS participant may sue the
BCS, it was also likely undreamed of in the early 1980s that member universities
would ever sue the NCAA under the anti-trust laws, as discussed supra notes 131-
148 and accompanying text.
303. See supra note 138 (noting threat of sanctions).
304. See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85 (1984) (resolv-
ing case in favor of plaintiff universities).
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competitive that it is not inconceivable that a BCS university would
challenge the BCS.
For example, the University of Texas recently threatened to
leave the Big Twelve for the Pac Ten to leverage the right to estab-
lish its own television network.30 5 Ultimately, Texas was able to lev-
erage this market power to obtain a favorable revenue sharing deal
within the Big Twelve.30 6 Some "brands" in college football are so
powerful that they may feel that if they challenge the system they
might be better off attacking it and hoping, through their greater
market power, to create a more lucrative system for themselves.30 7
This process may already be happening, as the organizers of
the BCS are re-evaluating certain aspects of the BCS system.30 8
Most notably, there have been proposals to eliminate automatic
305. See, e.g., Expansion Talk Swirls for Conferences, ESPN, http://sports.espn.go.
com/ncaa/news/story?id=5251329 (last updated Jun. 6, 2010, 10:38 AM) (review-
ing rumors of conference expansion and contraction); see also Would Horns of
Plenty Exit Big Twelve? Maybe, if Eyes of Texas See More, DALLAS NEWS (Feb. 19, 2010,
1:12 AM), http://www.dallasnews.com/sports/college-sports/texas-longhorns/
20100218-Would-Horns-of-plenty-exit-Big-6392.ece (noting economics could en-
courage Texas to leave Big Twelve). Texas was ultimately able to negotiate with
the Big Twelve to gain right to create its own TV network, and proceeded to sign a
$300 million contract with ESPN. See Michael Rosenberg, University of Texas' TV
Network is a Lucrative Web of Conflicts, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED., http://sportsillus-
trated.cnn.com/2011/writers/michael rosenberg/01/20/texas.tv/index.html
(last updatedJan. 20, 2011, 4:44 PM) (commenting on implications of Texas cable
network). Not to be outdone, the University of Oklahoma is considering a similar
move. See Sooners Considering Feasibility of Own TV Network, USA TODAY (Jun. 15,
2010, 9:24 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/sports/college/football/bigl2/2010-
06-15-sooners-tv-networkN.htm (noting Oklahoma is considering creating its own
cable network).
306. See Big 12 Sets up Restrictions on Longhorn Network, USA TODAY (Aug. 1,
2011, 10:38 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/sports/college/2011-08-01-big-12-
longhorn-network-restrictions n.htm (discussing creation of Longhorn Network).
Ultimately the Big 12 granted Texas the right to create its own television network,
with conditions. After evaluating the possibility of moving to another conference,
Texas ultimately agreed to stay in the Big 12 after the Big 12 offered substantial
concessions in the area of revenue sharing. See id. (describing financial benefits to
Texas of continued Big 12 membership).
307. See Peter J. Schwartz, The Most Valuable College Football Teams, FORBES
(Nov. 20, 2007, 10:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/2007/11/20/notre-dame-
fooball-biz-sports-cxps_1120collegeball.html (reviewing twenty most valuable col-
lege football franchises as measured by Forbes). The top ten most valuable college
football teams in 2007 were Notre Dame, Texas, Georgia, Michigan, Florida, LSU,
Tennessee, Auburn, Alabama, and Ohio State. Id. There were no Big East or ACC
teams in the top ten, but two Big Ten, one Big Twelve, and six SEC teams in
addition to Notre Dame. Id. It is perhaps ominous that most of the most valuable
football programs reside in the SEC, indicating that this conference, known for its
depth of quality football programs and enthusiastic fan base, would be the most
likely to challenge the appearance restriction in court. See id. (exemplifying eco-
nomic power of SEC).
308. See BCS Football Officials to Discuss Changes?, ESPN (Jan. 10, 2012, 11:23
AM), http://espn.go.com/college-football/story/_/id/7442352/bowl-champion-
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berths in BCS bowl games.309 If a powerful team, dissatisfied with
the results of negotiations, decided it could get more by "blowing
up" the system, an antitrust challenge might result.3 10 Should such
an antitrust challenge to the BCS prove successful, it would place
the BCS members in the difficult position of having to consider
eliminate what may have been a key element holding the BCS
agreement together in order to save the other aspects of the
system.3 1
F. Remedies
Another difficult aspect of the anti-trust analysis for the BCS is
exactly what remedy could arise out of a lawsuit. Courts ordering
anti-trust remedies certainly have broad equitable powers to force
certain conduct on parties guilty of anti-trust violations.312 But
eliminating the BCS may actually make things worse, not better, for
those who sought its destruction.313
Playoff proponents would likely argue for a judicially imposed
playoff system. While this may be beyond the realm ofjudicial com-
petency, a court could still give high-level guidance of what such a
ship-series-officials-discuss-possible-format-changes (describing possible upcoming
changes to BCS).
309. See id. (discussing proposal to eliminate automatic berths in BCS games).
310. See id. (noting importance of relative conference strength in negotia-
tions). Any changes in the BCS will undoubtedly be carefully negotiated and will
likely reflect the balance of power amongst the member conferences. See id.
(describing competing interests at play when discussing possible changes to BCS).
311. For a review of the evidence that the BCS was a carefully negotiated
agreement which might not survive if modified, see supra notes 214-218 and ac-
companying text. Eliminating certain aspects of the BCS will change the terms of
the deal which the BCS participants agreed to, and not all parties may be agreeable
to such changes. See id. (describing long development process of BCS which is
suggestive of difficult negeotation process).
312. See Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562, 577-78 (1972) ("Antitrust
relief should unfetter a market from anticompetitive conduct and 'pry open to
competition a market that has been closed by defendants' illegal restraints.'").
313. See Warmbrod, supra note 8, at 350 (acknowledging absence of non-BCS
teams from prestigious bowl games prior to BCS). Without the BCS, major college
bowl games would be free to ignore universities such as Boise State in favor of
universities with larger followings. See id. (noting BCS is required to grant bowl
game appearances to non-AQ teams which meet specified criteria). In the twenty
years prior to the formation of the BCS, 159 of the 160 participants in the four
BCS non-championship bowls (Rose, Orange, Sugar, and Fiesta) were from BCS
AQ conferences. See id. (exemplifying historical dominance of AQ conferences).
The one exception to this pattern, Louisville, would later join the Big East, a BCS
AQ conference. See id. at 351 (noting Louisville's eventual admission to Big East).
In reality, the BCS alters little from historical practice from the point of view of
non-BCS universities, as all six BCS conferences were in possession of the contrac-
tual conference tie-ins to the most prestigious bowl games. See id (noting most
prestigious bowl games historically have been played between BCS AQ schools).
2012] 595
HeinOnline  -- 19 Vill. Sports & Ent. L.J. 595 2012
56
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 19, Iss. 2 [2012], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol19/iss2/5
596 ViLLANovA SPORTS & ENT. LAw JouRNAL
system must look like in order to survive anti-trust scrutiny. Courts
have generated similar orders before. In United States v. United Shoe
Machine Co.,3 14 the court not only enjoined certain practices found
to be anti-competitive but it also mandated specific business con-
duct on the part of the guilty defendant.31 Along those lines, a
judge could order the implementation of a playoff system which
would guarantees every conference champion a chance at the na-
tional title and a more equitable share of the revenues.
But this outcome is unlikely. First of all, imposing a college
football playoff would have massive implications for all teams which
play college football.3 16 These repercussions would extend not only
to college athletic departments, but also to student athletes who
might be forced to miss class time in order to partake in a playoff
system.317 It should also not be forgotten that football is a contact
sport, and that injuries could result in additional games.3 18 A
314. 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953).
315. See United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass.
1953) (exemplifying broad remedial power of courts under anti-trust laws) affd per
curium, 347 U.S. 521 (1954). In United Shoe, the defendant controlled ninety-five
percent of the relevant market for shoe manufacturing machinery in the United
States. See id. at 297 (describing dominant market position of defendant). The
defendant engaged in several practices which were found to be anti-trust viola-
tions, notably that they refused to sell machines for making shoes and would only
lease them. See id. (identifying anticompetitive conduct at issue). The court,
among other things, ordered that at a minimum the defendant must sell their
machines at a price which made them economically competitive with leasing. See
id. (reviewing ordered remedies).
316. See Warmbrod, supra note 8, at 343-44 (reviewing common sources of
opposition to college football playoff). Commonly cited reasons to retain the ex-
isting bowl system are the abundance of postseason opportunities, interference
with the academic mission of universities, harm to communities hosting bowl
games, and a devaluation of the regular season. See id. (reviewing pro-bowl argu-
ments). See also Butch Henry, Football Playoff a Mistake?, AIKEN STANDARD (Jan. 4,
2011, 11:45 PM), http://www.aikenstandard.com/localsports/0105butch-henry-
column (discussing disruption college playoff would have on exams). Also, if the
NCAA basketball tournament is any indication, controversy over the college foot-
ball postseason will not end. See, e.g., Andy Glockner, Six Biggest Tournament Snubs,
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Mar. 13, 2011, 7:01 PM), http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/
2011 /writers/andyglockner/03/13/ncaa.tournament.biggest.snubs/index.html
(reviewing questionable participant selections for 2011 NCAA basketball tourna-
ment). The selection of at-large bids for the college basketball tournament are
often controversial, and there is no indication that the same controversies would
not occur in a football playoff. See id. (typifying controversies created by NCAA
selection committees).
317. See Butch Henry, supra note 316 (exemplifying argument that playoff
would disrupt academics). Disruption to exams and academics are an often cited
example of a disruption a playoff would cause. See also Nixon, supra note 5, at 388
(suggesting that if bowl season extended further it would disrupt life of student
athletes).
318. See, e.g., Florida WR Paul Wilson Suffers Career-Ending Foot Injury, USA To-
DAY (Aug. 14, 2009, 2:13 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/sports/college/football/
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player with dreams of professional stardom may have those dreams
die due to a catastrophic injury.319 At the same time, bowl games
are vital components of many local economies, and elimination of
these games or a reduction in their importance or appeal could
have adverse economic consequences.3 2 0
A judicially imposed playoff would also be far more intrusive
than the order in United Shoe.321 An order breaking up the BCS and
mandating the creation of a playoff system would be directly analo-
gous to the breakup order later overturned in the Microsoft anti-
trust case.3 2 2 Like the BCS, breaking up Microsoft would ultimately
create more problems arguably far worse than those posed by the
alleged anticompetitive conduct.323
The typical remedy in anti-trust law is to enjoin the anti-com-
petitive practice.324 If the court finds elements of the BCS to be
sec/2009-08-14-florida-wilson-injury_.N.htm (describing career ending injury to in-
jury plagued college football player). The threat of injury is ever present in a con-
tact sport such as football. See id. (typifying career ending football injury to college
football player).
319. See, e.g., Darren Rovell, Bush is Covered Against Career-Ending Injury, ESPN
(Jan. 4, 2006), http://sports.espn.go.com/ncf/bowls05/news/story?id=2280160
(reviewing insurance purchased by star running back Reggie Bush prior to 2006
Rose Bowl game).
320. See Nixon, supra note 5, at 389 (analyzing economic consequences of
substantial changes to existing bowl system). While such policy goals are outside
the realm of anti-trust law, they are very relevant if a political solution to the BCS
controversy was attempted. Eliminating the BCS would also have a tremendous
effect on the budgets of athletic departments across the country. See id. (noting
importance of BCS revenue to universities).
321. See supra note 315 (giving overview of United Shoe).
322. See United States v. Microsoft Corp., 97 F. Supp. 2d 59, 64-65 (D.D.C.
2000) (outlining divestiture plan ordered subsequent to finding of Microsoft anti-
trust violation). After years of litigation, Microsoft was found guilty of various anti-
trust violations and the district court ultimately determined the proper resolution
was a breakup of Microsoft. Id. (outlining divestiture plan ordered subsequent to
finding of Microsoft antitrust violation). However, after further appeals en-
couraged reconsideration of issues related to remedies and the underlying case
against the defendant, this extreme measure was overturned on appeal. See United
States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 104 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (reversing district court
judgment due to inadequate evidentiary inquiry into possible remedies, insuffi-
cient explanation of factual justifications for ordered remedy, and subsequent
reevaluations of scope of liability).
323. For a discussion of the college football national championship prior to
the era of the BCS, see supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text. Few college
football fans would welcome a return to the days of split national titles. See id
(discussing problems with pre-BCS status quo).
324. See United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass.
1952) (exemplifying practice of enjoining specific anti-competitive practices) affd
per curium, 347 U.S. 521 (1954). The BCS, if found liable under the anti-trust laws,
could simply modify its operation in such a way as to escape further scrutiny with-
out fundamentally altering the nature of the deal. See id. (typifying case where
breakup order was not found to constitute appropriate remedy). This has been
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anti-competitive, these elements might be stripped away while leav-
ing the basic structure in place. Alternatively, in the face of adverse
judgment the BCS might revise its procedures to eliminate the anti-
competitive practice without fundamentally altering the balance of
power which prompted the antitrust lawsuit.3 25 For those who wish
to see the end of the BCS, this would accomplish nothing. But if
the challenge came from within the BCS, the lawsuit might accom-
plish the aims of furthering the economic interest of some of the
more powerful programs.3 2 6
Destroying the BCS completely could have far reaching conse-
quences, for both AQ and non-AQ universities and conferences. It
would mean a return to the split national titles and disputed cham-
pionships so common in the era before the BCS.3 27 It would also
make it even harder for the non-AQ teams to compete in the ever-
growing collegiate arms race.3 2 8 By eliminating the BCS selection
identified as an advantage of the BCS system. See Schmit, supra note 8, at 245-46
(identifying adaptability of BCS to changing realities on field and in marketplace
as strength of BCS). Indeed, the BCS has changed in response to both controversy
and market demands in the past. In 2004, the system was changed to increase the
importance of the human polls in response to criticism. See supra note 97 (review-
ing changes to BCS following 2003 split national championship), In 2006, a na-
tional title game was added, increasing the number of available at-large bids and
expanding access for all teams, including deserving non BCS teams. See supra note
46 (noting creating of fifth BCS game for dedicated national title game). For a
discussion of the evolution of the BCS from 1998 to present, see supra notes 39-49
and accompanying text.
325. See supra note 10 (reviewing key cases of national football league anti-
trust litigation and subsequent history). The settlement negotiations following the
NFLPA anti-trust litigation ultimately resulted in the NFL CBA of 1993. See id.
(reviewing eventual outcome of late 1980s and early 1990s professional football
antitrust litigation).
326. See supra note 306 (outlining concessions obtained for Texas from Big
12). The University of Texas was able to use the threat of leaving the Big 12 to
obtain substantial concessions from the Big 12. See id. (noting stronger position of
Texas after threatening to leave). Another university could possibly use the threat
of an antitrust lawsuit to demand changes in the BCS favoring itself or its confer-
ence. See id. (exemplifying the usefulness of leverage in college althletics business
negeotiations).
327. For a discussion of the chaos of the pre-BCS era championships, see
supra notes 23-33 and accompanying text.
328. See Peter J. Schwartz, The Most Valuable College Football Teams, FORBES
(Nov. 20, 2007, 10:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/2007/11/20/notre-dame-
fooball-biz-sports-cx ps_1120collegeball.html (reviewing twenty most valuable col-
lege football franchises as measured by Forbes). Aside from Notre Dame, all of the
twenty most valuable college football teams are from BCS conferences. See id. (list-
ing most valuable college football programs). These economic disparities are only
exacerbated by the fact that BCS conferences have very lucrative conference level
television deals which are not shared with non-BCS conferences. See Grow, supra
note 8, at 84 (noting that Big Ten collected $242 million annually for its broadcast
rights, while the least valuable BCS conference broadcast rights, those of the Big
East, are worth $33 million per year).
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guidelines, no major bowls could be forced to take the small confer-
ence teams of college football.329 These revenue streams would be
closed to them.330
From a certain point of view, a return to the "bad old days"
might not be seen as a bad thing.3 3' Ironically, as non-AQ teams
become successful they are often invited to join AQ conferences.332
Most notably this happened with Utah, TCU and Boise State, who
will be joining BCS AQ conferences in the near future.333 Once
outsiders, their play on the field has earned them a place at the
table. As the number of college football programs expands, invaria-
bly the number of top-level teams would likely expand as well. 3 3 4
With or without the BCS system in place, successful teams will likely
find their way into AQ conferences.
The history of the Fiesta Bowl itself is instructive to how non-
AQ teams, in an environment with or without the BCS, could re-
spond to the perceived injustice forced upon them by the system.335
329. See supra note 99 (addressing issues of marketability and at large berths
in BCS bowls). These teams are generally less attractive to bowl games and are
often "snubbed" in favor of teams which may arguably be less deserving athletically
but which were more marketable. See id. (reviewing importance of marketability in
at-large team selection).
330. See supra note 194 (acknowledging uneven revenue distribution still dis-
tributes large amounts of revenue to non-AQ conferences). The BCS revenue dis-
tribution, while inequitable, could be construed as better than no revenue at all.
See id. (noting non-AQ schools and conferences still receive BCS revenue).
331. See McClelland, supra note 4, at 213 (claiming BCS creates and perpetu-
ates caste system in college football). Cutthroat competition may be more desira-
ble for a rising college football power than the "two tier" system perpetuated by the
BCS. See id. (setting forth argument that increased competition would improve
college football).
332. Utah and TCU are excellent examples of this trend. See supra notes 82-
84 (noting Utah and TCU will join BCS conferences in near future).
333. See id. (exemplifying move of successful non-AQ programs to AQ
conferences).
334. See supra note 25 (noting increase in number of bowl games). FBS Col-
lege Football, as evidenced by the increase in the number of bowl games, is a
growing market. See id. (noting growth in number of bowl games is exceeding
supply of bowl-worthy teams).
335. See Fiesta Bowl History, TICKET CTY, http://www.ticketcity.com/bowl-
game-tickets/fiesta-bowl-tickets/fiesta-bowl-history.html (last visited Apr. 13, 2012)
(recounting history of Fiesta Bowl). The Fiesta Bowl, first played in 1971, has a
colorful history, one which is instructive of the politics that often are behind the
bowl system and the selection of teams for the bowl games. See id. (recounting
history and development of Fiesta Bowl). The Western Athletic Conference
("WAC") was growing frustrated with its members being left out of existing major
bowl games. See id. (describing circumstances of WAC at time of creation of Fiesta
Bowl). As a result, it helped create the Fiesta Bowl to provide its members with an
automatic berth in a bowl game. See id. (identifying intitial purpose of Fiesta
Bowl). The Fiesta Bowl was a great success, so much so that in time the bowl's tie
in with the WAC disappeared in favor of creating more lucrative matchups, such as
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The Fiesta Bowl was born out of the frustrations of a conference
with members who were denied chances to play in a major bowl
game.3 36 Rather than accept the status quo, the slighted confer-
ence instead found a partner to create a premier bowl game of its
own.33 7 Even within the confines of the BCS, the Mountain West
Conference was making a play to become a seventh AQ confer-
ence.338 While this attempt failed, these approaches are perhaps
the best way for universities to build the foundations to one day
compete for a national title under the BCS system.339
V. CONCLUSION
The BCS truly is the best form of college football champion-
ship system that has been tried so far. While many sports fans
would undoubtedly prefer a playoff, the anti-trust laws are unlikely
to offer a remedy which would produce one.3 4 0 While anti-trust at-
tacks on the BCS from non AQ conferences, non AQ universities or
state attorney generals are unlikely to be successful, even if they
were they would likely only succeed in destroying or modifying the
the 1986 "national title game" between Penn State and Miami. See id. (exemplify-
ing success of new bowl game).
336. See id. (outlining history of Fiesta Bowl dating back to 1970s).
337. See id. (diagraming method in which teams were chosen to play in Fiesta
Bowl).
338. See supra notes 81-96 (outlining path to conference AQ status). This at-
tempt was a failure, but it does indicate that there is a viable path for non-AQ
universities and conferences to compete. See id. (reviewing theoretical path for
conference to gain AQ status). The path to become an AQ conference remains
open for all non-AQ conferences. Id. For a discussion of the Mountain West's
quest to become an AQ conference, see supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
339. See Corns, supra note 8, at 172 (describing early 1990s conference re-
alignment). Conferences rise and fall with the times. See id. (using Southwest Con-
ference as example of trend of shifting power in college football). At one point,
the Southwestern Conference was dismembered with the four strongest members
joining the Big Twelve and the four weakest being forced to join less prestigious
conferences without AQ status for the BCS or its predecessors. See id. (describing
end of Southwest Conference).
340. See, e.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 104 (D.C. Cir.
2001) (reversing district court judgment due to inadequate evidentiary inquiry
into possible remedies, insufficient explanation of factual justifications for ordered
remedy, and subsequent re-evaluations of scope of liability). Judicial imposition of
a playoff system in college football presents the same difficulties encountered
when the judiciary attempted to force the breakup of the software giant Microsoft
in the late 1990s. See id. (reviewing problems with Microsoft breakup order). Al-
though the district court which tried the Microsoft case found that Microsoft had
violated the anti-trust laws and ordered the breakup of the company to foster in-
creased competition, this order was reversed on appeal once it became apparent
that the nature of the relevant market a breakup of Microsoft would do more harm
than good. See id. (exemplifying case where ordered remedy would not help
consumers).
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current system without building something new and better to re-
place it.341 A challenge from within the BCS, aimed at eliminating
automatic berths or appearance restrictions is more likely to be suc-
cessful, and would likely come from a powerful team or conference
looking to enhance its bargaining position within the cartel.3 4 2
Eliminating the BCS would produce an even more lop-sided
playing field between the haves and have-nots in college football
compared with what now exists. 3 4 3 Without the objective require-
ments of the BCS guaranteeing non-AQ teams a seat at the table,
these teams can be shut out of the major bowl games.3 4 4 This
would only serve to exacerbate the revenue differential between
these universities and more established football programs, creating
greater competitive imbalance. For teams in the position of a Boise
State, getting rid of the BCS would make things worse, not
better.3 45
Coming full circle, as the BCS is the best form of champion-
ship except all others which have been tried perhaps it is best for
playoff proponents to resort to the best form of government except
for all that have been tried and bring about a playoff system
through lobbying and public relations efforts.346 The antitrust laws
341. For a discussion of the difficulties of remedies in the case of a successful
anti-trust challenge to the BCS, see supra notes 312-340 and accompanying text.
Antitrust laws are far more adept at destroying then they are at creating. See, e.g.,
Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 104 (providing example case of antitrust outcome which
would reduce economic utility for all). Merely sweeping aside the BCS will not
necessarily create conditions conducive to the creation of a playoff system or a
more inclusive bowl system, as evidenced by the difficulty in creating the BCS in
the first place, as discussed supra notes 21-49 and accompanying text.
342. See supra note 326 (noting use of leverage by major college football pro-
gram to obtain favorable treatment from conference).
343. See supra note 313 (noting that 159 of 160 participants in four BCS bowls
prior to the formation of BCS were from AQ conferences). Before the BCS, bowl
games were free to ignore what today are non-AQ teams when awarding bowl bids,
as was the case before the BCS. See id. (noting dominance of current AQ schools in
number BCS bowl game appearances). The BCS system at least allows non-AQ
teams to receive some of the riches which might otherwise only go to established
college football powers who are presently in AQ conferences. See id. (exemplifying
historical exclusion of non-AQ schools from premier bowl games).
344. For a review of how non-AQ teams have an objective road to BCS appear-
ances, see supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
345. See BCS, Alliance, & Coalition Games Year by Year, BCS FooTBALL, http://
www.bcsfootball.org/news/story?id=4809942 (last updated Feb. 10, 2011, 5:01 PM)
(reviewing Boise State appearances in BCS games). Boise State has played in two
BCS games, once as an automatic qualifier and once as an at-large bid. See id.
(noting BCS has greatly benefitted Boise State in terms of number of major bowl
appearances). The system is working for them about as well as it can for a non-AQ
team. See id. (noting Boise State has consistently appeared in BCS games).
346. See Grow, supra note 8, at 66-67 (describing formation, efforts, and par-
tial success of Presidential Coalition). In previous years a group of non-AQ confer-
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are not likely to bring the type of change that BCS critics would like
to see. 3 4 7 Things may not be perfect, but the system, as it stands
now, works out fairly well for all involved. Why mess up a good
thing?
ences banded together to form the Presidential Coalition for Athletics Reform
("Presidential Coalition"), seeking to compel the BCS to modify its selection pro-
cedures. See id. (describing efforts of the Presidential Coalition). The Presidential
Coalition ultimately persuaded Congress to become involved, with both the House
and Senate Judiciary Committees holding hearings in 2003. See id. (identifying
results of efforts of Presidential Coalition). Shortly thereafter, the BCS instituted
reforms including formally including non-BCS conferences in the BCS organiza-
tion and providing an easier path to an automatic berth for non AQ teams. See id.
(referring to reforms which ultimately resulted). Some BCS critics continue to
pursue this avenue for reform. See, e.g., Our Purpose, PLAYOFF PAC, http://www.
playoffpac.com/about/Default.aspx (last visited Apr. 13, 2012) (typifying effort at
political reform of BCS). -
347. For a discussion of the difficulties of determining the appropriate rem-
edy in a successful anti-trust challenge to the BCS, see supra notes 312-339 and
accompanying text.
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